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MANAGERS ACTING AS PRODUCERS
I. INTRODUCTION: THE FAULT LINES IN HOLLYWOOD
A long-feared unholy war between managers and agents is a growing
possibility.'
This [Shandling and Grey] split underscores the unique dynamic that
can result when talent representatives become more powerful than the
artists they represent.
2
Finding work in the entertainment industry has been a demoralizing
endeavor for aspiring artists ever since Hollywood's earliest years.
3
Indeed, the vast majority of young hopefuls find that enlisting someone to
help them procure work is a difficult task in its own right.4 The role of
talent agents--4o secure paying opportunities for artists--has evolved to
the extent that agents are now a luxury only the most successful artists can
afford.5 The first helpful person an actor will meet in Hollywood, if the
actor is lucky, will most likely be a personal manager.6 When a manager
sees a glimmer of potential in a young artist, the manager will attempt to
nurture that fresh talent and work with the actor to build a mutually
beneficial career in show business.
Managers have long been considered junior peers to the more noble
talent agents in the entertainment aristocracy because of the untidy nature
of their in loco parentis relationship with many artists.7 Enrolling clients in
dance lessons and cleaning up drug-riddled actors is a far less glamorous
job than negotiating employment contracts for millions of dollars. 8 The
reputational disparity between managers and agents has long been reflected
in the relative cachet of the tables each landed at The Palm. In recent
1. Chris Petrikin, Rival Reps Ready to Rumble, VARIETY, Oct. 12-18, 1998, at 1 [hereinafter
Rival Reps].
2. Claudia Eller & Brian Lowry, Bitter Shandling-Grey Break-Up Strikes a Nerve in
Hollywood, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1998, at D1.
3. See, e.g., M.K. LEWIS & ROSEMARY R. LEWIS, YOUR FILM ACTING CAREER: HOW TO
BREAK INTO THE MOVIES & TV & SURVIVE IN HOLLYWOOD 5-7 (3d ed. 1993).
4. See, e.g., Kim Masters, Star Wars, VANITY FAIR, April 1999, at 160 [hereinafter Star
Wars].
5. See Telephone Interview with Mike Macari, Talent Agent, United Talent Agency (Mar.
29, 1999).
6. See Telephone Interviews with Manya Klempner, Talent Manager, The Firm (Jan. 15,
1999 & Mar. 29, 1999).
7. See Star Wars, supra note 4, at 156.
8. See id. (describing the efforts of long-time manager Phyllis Carlyle to rehabilitate
Melanie Griffith before an audition).
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years, however, talent agents have seen much of the sheen of their
occupation dulled by the encroachment of lawyers and managers upon their
traditional domain. 9 Managers have enjoyed a corresponding ascendancy
as they have expanded their fiefdoms into increasingly powerful empires
by wielding their unique power ability to own and produce the shows of
their clients, which by law, agents cannot do.10
Perhaps no single development has signaled the new puissance of
personal management more than the formation of Artists Management
Group ("AMG") by erstwhile superagent Michael Ovitz. 11 After founding
the "mothership" of all talent concerns, Creative Artists Agency ("CAA"),
Ovitz resigned at the zenith of his power to take a second-in-command
position at the Disney Corporation. 12  Fourteen months and one
ignominious termination later, Ovitz seemed banished to the hinterlands of
Hollywood. 13 Two years later in November 1998, however, he announced
his return to the fray, not as an agent, but as a manager. 14 By stamping his
imprimatur on the management business, Ovitz plundered the major talent
agencies for clients 15 and managers, thrusting the prominence of personal
managers to the front pages of industry publications and beyond.1
6
The power and eminence that managers now possess has not come
without a cost. The din of complaints about their mode of business has
risen to a cacophony on the front pages of Variety and the Hollywood
Reporter.17 Because managers are now so much in the sun,'8 new light is
9. See Peter Bart, Agentosaurus Rex, GQ, Jan. 1999, at 55, 58 (predicting that the increasing
influence of managers and lawyers may make this once dominant Hollywood species irrelevant);
see also James Bates & Claudia Eller, Ovitz, Kuehl Rocking Boat for Agents, Managers, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 23, 1999, at Cl (reporting the recent threats posed to agents by Michael Ovitz's new
management firm, Artists Management Group ("AMG"), and Assemblywoman Sheila Kuehl's
newly introduced legislation).
10. See generally Fred Jelin, The Personal Manager Controversy: Carving the Turf, in
COUNSELING CLIENTS IN THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY 1993, at 473 (PLI Pat., Copyrights,
Trademarks and Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. G-359, 1993) (identifying the
economic and legal freedoms enjoyed by managers).
11. See Stephen Galloway, Mike the Manager, HOLLYWOOD REP., Dec. 8-14, 1998, at 14
(announcing Ovitz's new entrepreneurial venture into the personal management business).
12. See Star Wars, supra note 4, at 160.
13. See id.
14. See Corie Brown, Managing Hollywood, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 30, 1998, at 40.
15. See Chris Petrikin, Williams, Marshall, Joining Ovitz Stable, DAILY VARIETY, Jan. 21,
1999, at 1; Frank Rose, Hide Your Clients! Mike Ovitz Returns to L.A., FORTUNE, Mar. 1, 1999,
at 44.
16. See Kim Masters, Comeback Kid?, TIME, Nov. 30, 1998, at 112.
17. See, e.g., Zorianna Kit, Target: Over-Produced Films, HOLLYWOOD REP., Mar. 29,
1999, at 4, 28 (describing the problem of managers demanding producing credits on films which
they have added no value, thereby diluting the value of credits earned by producers actually
performing the traditional tasks of a producer); Chris Petrikin, Percent Dissent Foments, DAILY
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being shone upon their practice of producing their clients' television shows
and films. Unlike talent agents, who are prohibited by law from owning
any portion of the work performed by their clients,' 9 personal managers
may acquire a financial interest in clients' products and thereby participate
in the lucrative upside of successful entertainment ventures. Nevertheless,
when a personal manager simultaneously acts as an artist's representative
and as a functionary of that artist's employer, conflicts of interest loom.
20
These conflicts have been vividly highlighted by a recently settled
lawsuit in which critically acclaimed comedian Garry Shandling sued his
former friend and manager, 2' Brad Grey, for one hundred million dollars.
22
Shandling claimed that Grey had breached a host of fiduciary duties.23
Shandling alleged that Grey had divided his loyalties between Shandling
and Grey's own financial interests in the Shandling show he produced, The
Larry Sanders Show.24  This litigation illustrates a myriad of problems
artists may face when managers produce their artists' works. In
combination with this lawsuit, the high profile Ovitz is casting a spotlight
on the trade that many managers find unwelcome.26
VARIETY, Oct. 16, 1998, at 1 [hereinafter Percent] (reporting the growing annoyance of talent
agents with the proliferation of managers procuring employment for artists).
18. See generally Kit, supra note 17. The changes taking place in the entertainment
industry's landscape are being reported well beyond the confines of trade publications. Many
national publications, with a variety of target audiences, have also published accounts of this
trend. See, e.g., Bart, supra note 9, at 55; John Mankiewicz, Fax From Los Angeles, NEW
YORKER, Mar. 15,'1999, at 34; Star Wars, supra note 4, at 154.
19. See generally Star Wars, supra note 4.
20. See generally Hal I. Gilenson, Badlands: Artist-Personal Manager Conflicts of Interest
In the Music Industry, 9 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 501 (1991) (providing a detailed account of
the conflicts of interest that may proliferate between managers and their clients in the music
industry and referring to similar phenomena in the entertainment business).
21. Attorneys for Shandling contend that these types of conflicts occurred in the relationship
between Grey and Shandling. See Telephone Interview with Larry Silverman, Attorney for Garry
Shandling (Feb. 10, 1999). Even if these conflicts did not occur, however, the arguments asserted
on both sides of the litigation illustrate conflicts to which the profession is vulnerable, and which
may very well occur in the relationships between other personal managers and their clients.
22. See Brian Lowry, Garry Shandling Sues Ex-Manager for $100 Million, L.A. TIMES,
JAN. 16, 1998, at Dl (reporting the legal aspects of the newly filed lawsuit).
23. The plaintiffs' causes of action in this suit include breach of fiduciary duty, breach of
contract, equitable relief and accounting, rescission, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and
breach of partnership agreement. Amended Complaint, Shandling v. Grey, BC 184316 (Cal.
Super. Ct. filed June 23, 1998).
24. See Jonathan Davies, Shandling, Grey Attorneys Spar, HOLLYWOOD REP., Mar. 12,
1998, at 3, 63 (detailing the contours of the lawsuit).
25. See Gloves Are Off in Split with Manager, USA TODAY, Mar. 13, 1998, at 3D.
26. See Star Wars, supra note 4, at 170.
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As the Shandling litigation marched toward trial in the summer of
199927 and Ovitz publicly wrestled with his former colleagues at CAA,
another development added yet more fuel to this industry conflagration.18
California State Assemblywoman Sheila Kuehl grew tired of "scam
artists, ' 2 9 posing as talent managers to defraud would-be child actors and
others with fly-by-night operations.30 In an effort to remedy the problem,
she introduced a bill in the California legislature that purported to subject
managers to regulations similar to those currently imposed on talent
agents.3 '
While talent agents would be happy to see managers lose their highly
coveted ability to produce shows, few of them applaud the prospect of state
lawmakers dabbling in regulations governing the business of artists'
32representation. If the Assembly's investigation of the management
business expands to the closely related craft of agenting, a blunt legislative
parang could ravage agents as well.33 Agents themselves enjoy the highly
profitable right to receive "packaging fees"' 34 from studios for herding their
clients into tidy bundles for specific projects. Agents would dearly hate to
lose that source of income under broad new legislation.35 Managers, of
course, were extremely concerned with Kuehl's legislation and quickly
27. See Telephone Interview with Peter Haviland, Attorney for Garry Shandling (Feb. 10,
1999).
28. See Sharon Waxman, Hollywood's Latest Thriller: The Return of Ovitz, WASH. POST,
Jan. 26, 1999, at C7 (describing the confluence of events occurring in Los Angeles that transpired
to elevate this issue to an especially high profile).
29. Kirk Honeycutt, Managers Bill Is Put in Play, HOLLYWOOD REP., Feb. 26-28, 1999, at
3.
30. See id.; see also Telephone Interviews with Bethany Aseltine, Legislative Assistant to
Assemblywoman Kuehl (Jan. 26, 1999 & Apr. 13, 1999) (providing background on Kuehl's
motivations for proposing her bill to regulate personal managers).
31. See A.B. 884, 1999-2000 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999) (as amended on Apr. 26, 1999)
(recommending changes to the currently existing Talent Agencies Act that would broaden that
Act's scope to include personal managers and subject them to many similar regulations); Kirk
Honeycutt, Managers Bill Is Put in Play, HOLLYWOOD REP., Feb. 26-28, 1999, at 3, 113
(reporting Kuehl's introduction of her new legislation).
32. See Telephone Interview with Karen Stuart, Executive Director, Association of Talent
Agents (Jan. 27, 1999) (outlining the perspectives of many talent agents on the legislative
developments aimed at personal managers).
33. See id.
34. Star Wars, supra note 4, at 160.
35. See Telephone Interview with Karen Stuart, Executive Director, Association of Talent
Agents (Jan. 27, 1999).
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formed a professional coalition to deal effectively and cohesively with the
proposal.36
The personal management profession is currently the hottest topic of
discussion with the Los Angeles entertainment business 37 and is unlikely to
proceed unregulated for much longer. All sides weighed in on the debate,
and the California State Assembly fired up the legislative locomotive. 38 As
lawmakers begin to consider establishing new rules for the personal
manager, they will need to consider the variety of options before them.
They must also decide whether any legislation is needed in an area where
the "perpetrators" are wildly prosperous representatives and the "victims"
are their equally successful celebrities.
This Article argues that the most appropriate response to this situation
is for the entertainment guilds to use their strategic position in the industry
to oversee personal managers and to regulate the degree to which those
managers can act as producers. 39 Correspondingly, state lawmakers should
resist the temptation to embroil themselves in a fracas amongst powerful
and wealthy businesspersons, by rejecting any attempt to levy blunt
regulations upon the entertainment industry. 40 The power of unions will fill
the informational gaps that afflict an otherwise capable regime of free
contract and common law remedies. 4' The problems accented in the
Shandling litigation, for example, can be handled adequately by the
common law causes of action the plaintiffs deployed.42 State lawmakers
should defer to collective bargainers to tune this market, which suffers only
from informational disparities. Wealthy participants are capable of
bargaining freely for what they want by using common law remedies to
protect themselves against managers' transgressions.43
Part II provides an overview of the traditional roles of managers and
talent agents and the distinct regulatory schemes governing the two groups.
Section A focuses on talent agents and the specific services they provide to
their clients as they procure employment opportunities and negotiate
contractual terms. Section B provides an analogous explanation of
personal managers and further explores the roles they play through a
36. See Stephen Galloway & Anita M. Busch, Managers Get Together for Key Strategy
Session, HOLLYWOOD REP., Feb. 19-21, 1999, at 1; Chris Petrikin, Managers Unite to Fight
Measures, DAILY VARIETY, Feb. 22, 1999, at 5.
37. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
38. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
39. See discussion infra Part IV.
40. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
41. See discussion infra Part IV.B.2.a.
42. See discussion infra Part IH.B.
43. See discussion infra Part V.
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description of the contracts they negotiate with artists. Section C outlines
the restrictions of the Talent Agent Act ("TAA") and other legal precepts
governing agents and their legislative histories. Section D provides a
glimpse of the private law governing agents and the way in which the
entertainment guilds mediate the business relationship between agents and
their clients. Finally, Section E recounts the way in which personal
managers have escaped regulation by both public laws and private
agreements.
Building upon the legal and historical foundation discussed in Part II,
Part III illustrates why the vocation of personal management has been
catapulted to the center of the entertainment industry's consciousness in
recent years. The public war between Michael Ovitz and his detractors
over the birth of AMG-a central ingredient of the imbroglio-is detailed
in Section A. Section A also describes the task of producing and why this
enterprise has recently proliferated in Hollywood. To provide a study of
the conflicts of interest created when managers act as producers, Section B
recounts the heated litigation between Shandling and Grey that recently
took place in a Los Angeles Superior Court. Section C identifies many of
the sharpest criticisms currently being leveled against managers as they
produce an increasing number of their clients' projects.
Part IV explores a variety of possible solutions to the complaints
against managers. Section A covers the options provided by public law,
such as the proposal to regulate managers introduced in Sacramento by
Assemblywoman Sheila Kuehl, and the ramifications of expanding Kuehl's
proposal in order to ban producing by managers. Ultimately, Section A
rejects legislation as a viable solution to the conflicts of interest because of
its blunt and inflexible application to the artist representation industry, as
well as its political feasibility. Finally, Section B argues that the optimal
solution to this problem is a combination of two private law tools: contract
and guild regulations. This section explores the informational limitations
of the current market in artist representation, but concludes that the
exceptional wealth of both groups of participants in this market and their
ability to proceed without the state's intervention militate in favor of a
primarily private solution. The limitations of absolute laissez-faire can be
overcome by invoking the untapped resources of contract's private law
sibling, collective bargaining agreements. The entertainment unions are in
a better position than state legislatures to determine optimal guidelines for
managers and their clients. The guilds can impose these guidelines through
their negotiations with all ancillary entertainment professionals, including
agents and managers.
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Part V presents conclusions that build upon the arguments developed
in Part IV. Although the entertainment industry may not have been
profoundly altered by the consequences of the Shandling litigation, this
litigation has highlighted problems in the industry. The effects of these
problems can be modulated by the preemptive actions of private actors.
Guilds can no longer afford to abdicate the duty they owe their members
and must act to provide artists the necessary information to combat the
risks they face from managers who produce. Guilds should also flex the
power of their ability to promulgate their own regulations, which are far
more tailored and responsive than the clumsy implements of the legislature.
II. THE REGULATORY SCHEME GOVERNING MANAGERS AND AGENTS
Agents have regarded most managers as gum on their shoes ....
[M]anagers see agents as vultures that swoop in once the managers have
worked their magic.
44
Los Angeles has, for many decades, been fertile ground for a diverse
crop of professionals who seek to serve as attendants to the stars.45 The
business of being a celebrity has metastasized to such a degree that many
entertainers now rely upon intermediaries to handle myriad tasks-among
them, procuring employment, advising clients about career choices,
investing personal monies and providing legal representation. 46 The typical
stable for a major entertainment luminary includes a talent agent, a
personal manager, a business manager and a lawyer, each of whom may
exact a percentage of the client's income.47 To represent the entertainer
effectively, these professionals must work harmoniously to coordinate their
efforts on the client's behalf 48 Recent temblors in Hollywood tectonics,
however, have generated friction between two of the dominant masses of
representatives: talent agents and personal managers.49
While the formal titles and many of the tasks of these entertainment
representatives vary, the primary function of each group is to create and
44. Star Wars, supra note 4, at 156.
45. See PAUL C. WEILER, ENTERTAINMENT, MEDIA AND THE LAW: TEXT, CASES,
PROBLEMS 691-95 (1997) (explaining the functions, historical background and legal framework
of several players in the entertainment industry).
46. See id. at 691-92.
47. See id.
48. See id. at 692.
49. See, e.g., Josh Chetwynd, Ovitz, CAA Keep Firing in Talent Turf War, USA TODAY,
Mar. 3, 1999, at 4D; Stephen Galloway, War's Declared: All Ovitz and CAA Share Is Hostility,
HOLLYWOOD REP., Jan. 26-Feb. 1 1999, at 4, 90; see also Rival Reps, supra note 1, at 1.
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maintain a successful career for their clients. Consequently, a great deal of
their work overlaps.5 ° The law governing the professional activities of
these representatives attempts to parse their roles and to regulate them
based upon those distinctions. The difficulty of performing this task
clinically has resulted in a lack of true legal differentiation amongst
representatives and a corresponding degree of disenchantment in the
industry. 51  In the case of talent agents and personal managers, the
extensive blurring of lines between their functions has created a growing
brawl that is regularly featured on the front pages of entertainment trade
publications.52
A. Talent Agents
A talent agent's primary role is to procure employment for artists by
marketing the artists' talents throughout the entertainment industry.53 This
task is the oldest form of entertainer representation and dates back to the
formation of the William Morris Agency ("WMA") in fln-de-sicle New
York City.54 In the past century, talent agencies have evolved to dominate
the industry to such a degree that the major players-Creative Artists
Agency ("CAA"), International Creative Management ("ICM"), United
Talent Agency ("UTA") and WMA---are now recognized beyond the
entertainment industry. Each of these houses reaps as much as ten percent
of all the fees earned by their thousands of celebrity clients. 55 Agents also
earn extremely lucrative "packaging fees" for assembling teams of
artists-such as a producer, director, actor and writer--and selling these
packages to studios that underwrite the entire production.56
1. The Role of a Talent Agent
A roster of high-profile clients is the key to success as a talent agent.
57
The efforts an agent expends in finding employment for an artist pay off
50. See WEILER, supra note 45, at 692.
51. See Erik B. Atzbach, Drawing the Line Between Personal Managers and Talent Agents:
Waisbren v. Peppercorn, 4 UCLA ENT. L. REv. 81, 82-83 (1996).
52. See Percent, supra note 17, at 1.
53. See Telephone Interview with Mike Macari, Talent Agent, United Talent Agency (Mar.
29, 1999).
54. See WELER, supra note 45, at 692; Robert Hofler, B 'way Biz Buzzes On, DAILY
VARIETY, Oct. 20, 1998, at 5.
55. See Telephone Interview with Dan Cox, Reporter, Variety (Jan. 26, 1999).
56. See Star Wars, supra note 4, at 160.
57. See Telephone Interview with Sheldon Sroloff, Talent Agent, Creative Artists Agency
(Jan. 27, 1999).
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only when the client is in demand from entertainment purveyors.5 8 These
labors require agents to build and maintain elaborate databases of industry
contacts, to execute complex business negotiations and to service the
overhead costs of expensive office space. 59 Because agents subsist by
tithing their clients, these clients must earn substantial sums in order to
cover their representatives' expenses. Profitability for talent agents,
therefore, typically comes from representing established artists. As a
result, an agent will rarely, if ever, agree to work for an unknown, aspiring
client.
60
Agents address their precarious position of eating only when their
clients feast in other ways as well. In the typical contract between a talent
agent and a client, the agent demands exclusivity and universality. 61 That
is, the agent aims to capture the right to be the client's exclusive talent
agent and represent the client in all forms of entertainment.62 The
universality clause guarantees the agent will receive a percentage of the
client's total income. 63 Although superstars occasionally receive job offers
without an agent's assistance, most artists rely heavily on agents to find
them employment. As a result, the contract between the talent agent and
the artist cements the symbiotic relationship between the two parties.
Talent agents assert that their hefty fees are justified by the skills they
bring to their clients, such as the ability to mediate between buyers and
sellers of talent. 64 First and foremost, skilled agents have access to a great
deal of parties interested in hiring artists.65  Agents must maintain good
relationships with individuals financially capable of hiring artists in order
to procure engagements for clients. Another important asset of a successful
66agent is a finely calibrated knowledge of the market for particular artists.This is crucial to negotiating the best possible deal.67
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. See James M. O'Brien III, Regulation of Attorneys Under California's Talent Agencies
Act: A Tautological Approach to Protecting Arists, 80 CAL. L. REv. 471,480 (1992).
61. See id. at 479; Heath B. Zarin, The California Controversy Over Procuring
Employment: A Case for the Personal Managers Act, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 927, 936 (1997).
62. See O'Brien, supra note 60, at 479; Zarin, supra note 61, at 936.
63. See O'Brien, supra note 60, at 479; Zarin, supra note 61, at 936.
64. See Telephone Interview with Karen Stuart, Executive Director, Association of Talent
Agents (Jan. 27, 1999).
65. See O'Brien, supra note 60, at 471-85.
66. See Telephone Interview with Karen Stuart, Executive Director, Association of Talent
Agents (Jan. 27, 1999).
67. Id.
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2. The Historical Background of Talent Agents
On October 20, 1898, William Morris, Sr. announced the opening of
his talent agency by hanging a shingle at 105 East 14th Street in New York
City, proclaiming "William Morris, Vaudeville Agent.', 68 Vaudeville was
the preeminent form of entertainment at the time and Morris quickly began
representing such stars as Al Jolson, the Marx Brothers, Mae West and
Charlie Chaplin. 69  Even as he forged his Vaudeville business, Morris
recognized the form's impending demise and capitalized on the emerging
potential of motion pictures by signing his stars to Hollywood's growing
medium, the silent film.
70
The emergence of television in the 1940's had a profound effect on
the film industry. 7' Agencies such as WMA took advantage of the
opportunities that emerged during this metamorphosis. 72 In pre-television
Hollywood, studios were able to capitalize on the absence of other forms of
entertainment. 73 Such a void created a buyer's market for studios vis-A-vis
entertainers, forcing stars to sign long-term obligations.74 The advent of
television shifted negotiating clout back to actors and altered artistic
contracts from long-term engagements to specific movie deals.75 With this
emasculation of film studios' power, agencies began to wield their power
by packaging multiple artists.76 The expansion of agencies into the
packaging business generated a profitable new revenue stream and
buttressed their central role in the entertainment industry.77
A concomitant factor in the entertainment industry's development
occurred in the 1950's and 1960's, when the federal government mandated
a breakup of the vertically integrated oligopoly endemic to the film studio
system, in which one corporation owned interests in talent, production and
68. See Robert Hofler, B 'way Biz Buzzes On, DAILY VARIETY, Oct. 20, 1998, at 5.
69. See Robert Koehler, Biggest Show on Earth: William Morris Celebrates Its Centennial,
DAILY VARIETY, Oct. 20, 1998, at 2; William Morris Timeline, DAILY VARIETY, Oct. 20, 1998,
at6.
70. See FRANK ROSE, THE AGENCY: WILLIAM MORRIS AGENCY AND THE HIDDEN
HISTORY OF SHOW BusINESS 13 (1995).
71. See WEILER, supra note 45, at 693.
72. See Koehler, supra note 69, at 5. One of the more impressive deals was struck by agent
Johnny Hyde on behalf of Rita Hayworth. Id. Her contract with Columbia entitled her to 25% of
her movies' net profits and script approval. Id.




77. See id. at 693.
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distribution.78 When the studios relinquished expensive talent in the wake
of this mandated breakup, they lost the ability to coordinate the contracts of
artists who possessed the skills necessary to produce a successful film or
television series. 79 Only agencies could fill the vacuum for artists. Thus,
WMA and other agencies put together lucrative packages for their stars,
making this a financial influx and a "cash cow" for WMA. s
As the entertainment industry continued to evolve into a multifaceted
medium, so too did the departments of talent agencies.8 ' In addition to the
mainstays of radio, theatrical and literary divisions, new groups developed
to handle television, musical, motion picture and nightclub issues.8 2 The
WMA remained at the forefront, serving as the incubator for such
entertainment giants as Barry Diller, David Geffen and Michael Ovitz.
83
The agency landscape changed dramatically in 1975, however, when Ovitz
left WMA with his colleague Ron Meyer and three of their fellow agents to
form their own firm, CAA. 4
Under Ovitz's governance, CAA quickly emerged as the dominant
talent agency in Hollywood. 85 Having built an expansive list of more than
1000 celebrity clients, CAA leveraged that asset into fruitful packaging
deals. After several years of representing the highest profile artists in the
business, Ovitz was anointed the "most powerful person" in Hollywood.86
Ovitz gained a reputation for aggressive business tactics including
accusations that he poached talent from rival agencies. 87 Influenced by
Ovitz, the talent agency business reached its zenith in the mid-1990's
before a series of events undercut the prominence of agents in the
entertainment business.
One of these developments was the blow CAA suffered in 1995 when
Ovitz resigned from the agency to serve as President of the Walt Disney
Corporation, the studio's second-in-command under Chairman and CEO
78. See Koehler, supra note 69, at 5.
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See ROSE, supra note 70, at 133-302.
82. Id.
83. See generally ROSE, supra note 70.
84. See WEILER, supra note 45, at 694.
85. See Bernard Weinraub, After Ovitz: How Agency Hung Tough, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8,
1999, at C1.
86. Tom King, Hollywood Journal: Sticker Shock: The $25 Million Star, WALL ST. J., Jan.
7, 2000, at Wl.
87. See Weinraub, supra note 85.
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Michael Eisner. 88 The agency's co-founder, Ron Meyer, had left CAA
only one month earlier to become the President of MCA/Universal. Trade
publications speculated effusively as to the consequences these moves
would have on CAA and the industry in general. While nothing drastic
occurred to topple agents from their lofty perches as Hollywood power
players,8 9 more and more cracks began to appear in their tower.
While Ovitz and Meyer were departing the profession, attorneys had
already noticed the swelling coffers of entertainers and started to ply an
increasingly diverse array of services to celebrities. In addition to
representing clients in legal matters, many lawyers were called upon by
artists to perform functions typically handled by agents, namely;
employment contract negotiations.90 Because lawyers at first charged
hourly rates that amounted to far lower fees than agents, frugal artists took
advantage of these bargains.91 Many attorneys subsequently increased their
fees to meet the industry's heightened demand. The expansion of options
for artists seeking representation diluted the primacy agents once enjoyed
in this area. Although talent agents still play a pivotal role in most
employment deals in Hollywood, they are no longer the masters of the
universe they were when Michael Ovitz and CAA dominated the
entertainment business in the early 1990's.
Ovitz stands accused of upsetting much of the balance of power in the
entertainment business in his bid to manipulate a celebrity culture. By
turning his clients into superstars with massive salaries and participating in
gross profits, he amassed tremendous power as the gatekeeper to the stars.
92
One commentator has theorized that Ovitz's strategy was financially
successful. By accruing more power as a seller than any buyer, however,
he "made himself the target of a great deal of fear and loathing."93 His
legacy still lingers in the entertainment business. Currently, Hollywood
boasts over 100 agents and managers earning over $1 million.94
88. See Stuart Elliott, The Media Business: Ovitz Leaves a Legacy ofJolting Madison Ave.,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1995, at D6.
89. See generally Weinraub, supra note 85.
90. See Star Wars, supra note 4, at 160-67.
91. See id.
92. See Newsstand: CAN & Entertainment Weekly (CNN Television Broadcast, July 8,
1999).
93. Bart, supra note 9, at 55.
94. See id. at 56.
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B. Personal Managers
While personal managers are naturally interested in seeing their
clients find employment, their core functions focus on other aspects of an
artist's career.95  Personal managers advise their clients on both the
minutiae of daily life as an artist and the broader trajectory of an
entertainment career.96 As one industry journalist has summarized the role,
a manager is "supposed to be the deep thinker who masterminds clients'
careers and holds their hands., 97 As part of this expansive role, a manager
will perform a variety of consulting tasks, including arranging additional
representation when a talent agent or attorney becomes necessary, as well
as advising the client on accepting deals procured by those other
representatives.
98
1. The Role of a Personal Manager
Ultimately, managers exist to give artists time to hone their craft and
to create their art. To clear the schedules of their clients, managers take
responsibility for many aspects of their clients' personal and professional
lives.99 They arrange for training to develop skills that can contribute to
their marketability, such as acting lessons and voice training, as well as
handling such mundane concerns as travel planning. 00 Many managers
become close enough to their clients that they basically stand in loco
parentis and are often in the best position to provide advice on personal
problems affecting the artist.
101
One very important area in which managers facilitate the careers of
their clients involves financial matters.10 2 Managers often advance funds to
their clients to cover the costs of initial personal and business outlays, such
as rent, artistic training, miscellaneous bills and a professional portfolio.
0 3
Managers may also act as rudimentary financial advisors for fledgling
clients by collecting revenues, paying taxes and investing profits, all the
95. See Telephone Interview with Manya Klempner, Talent Manager, The Firm (Jan. 15,
1999 & Mar. 29, 1999).
96. See id.
97. Bart, supra note 9, at 56.
98. See O'Brien, supra note 60, at 482-83.
99. See id.
100. See WEILER, supra note 45, at 691.
101. See id.
102. See id. at 691-92.
103. See Telephone Interview with Manya Klempner, Talent Manager, The Firm (Jan. 15,
1999 & Mar. 29, 1999).
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while developing a longer-range financial portfolio. °4 Once a client's
financial position has grown to a sufficient level, a personal manager may
help locate and retain a more sophisticated financial specialist to act as the
artist's business manager. 0 5 Additionally, managers can acquire a personal
financial interest in their client's product by investing in their projects,
providing funds necessary to complete artistic ventures and participating in
any profits or losses of those essays. 10 6  This practice of producing a
client's project is one critical distinction between agents and managers.
Agents are strictly prohibited from such transactions, while managers may
reap large profits from such enterprises. 1
07
Because personal managers are deeply involved in their clients' lives
and strive to provide the constant attention their stars may require, they
typically represent only a few artists.10 8  Whereas a talent agent may
procure work for twenty or thirty clients, a personal manager may represent
as a few as five or six.'0 9 Indeed, even management firms, composed of
several managers representing multiple clients, operate on a smaller scale
than talent agencies, which can maintain client rosters numbering in the
thousands." 0 To compensate for having fewer sources of income and
expending more effort per client, managers demand ten to fifty-five percent
of their client's gross earnings for their services in contrast to the ten
percent charged by agents."'
2. Personal Management Agreements
Like agents, managers typically seek an exclusivity clause in a
personal management agreement to prevent the client from retaining any
other managers. 12 Because of the large investments managers make in the
lives and careers of their clients, they often ask for long-term contracts to
protect their connection to their client's future success. A management
agreement will typically run for three to five years, whereas a talent agent's
agreement rarely lasts longer than one year.' 13
104. See WEILER, supra note 45, at 691-92.
105. See id. at 692.
106. See also Zarin, supra note 61, at 937-38.
107. See Atzbach, supra note 7, at 82-83.
108. See Telephone Interview with Manya Klempner, Talent Manager, The Firm (Jan. 15,
1999 & Mar. 29, 1999).
109. See WEILER, supra note 45, at 691.
110. See Star Wars, supra note 4, at 156, 158.
111. See O'Brien, supra note 60, at 483; Zarin, supra note 61, at 936.
112. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
113. See Zarin, supra note 61, at 940-91.
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Personal managers are prohibited by law from procuring employment
for their clients, unless they become talent agents and submit to the
regulatory regime that governs agents.' 4  Therefore, artists will almost
always need the services of a talent agent." 5 Because many agents refuse
to represent unestablished talent, artists also need personal managers to
help build their careers. Managers are usually the first representation an
artist finds. If the relationship is a successful partnership, the manager will
also become an artist's closest career advisor. Because they present
agencies with filtered talent, managers help artists evade the catch-22 of
being unable to find work without an agent and being unable to acquire an
agent without being established. 1
6
The professional distinction between managers and agents has enough
of a logical point of separation to justify many stars and filmmakers
retaining the services of both.' '7  Describing what was traditionally the
distinction between the two, veteran manager Bernie Brillstein, of the
prominent management firm Brillstein-Grey Entertainment," 18 commented,
"Managers found and nurtured the talent and hired the agents. Managers
shaped careers while agents made the deals and, now and then, came up
with a piece of material."
' 19
While managers, unlike agents, have always been able to acquire an
ownership interest in their clients' product, this ability to produce has only
recently been recognized as a major asset to the profession. Managers have
often been among the first to invest in the talents of artists, long before the
general public has acknowledged their worth. Indeed, many celebrities
began their careers by persuading managers to underwrite their ventures.
One can imagine a manager eagerly providing funds to a young Steven
Spielberg to ensure that his first major film was made in the event that the
studios and other financiers refused to underwrite his work. For many
years, this practice of advancing funds to an artist was viewed in something
114. See discussion infra Part II.C.
115. See Telephone Interview with Karen Stuart, Executive Director, Association of Talent
Agents (Jan. 27, 1999). Not all agents see this dependency as a benefit to their profession,
however, as many managers allegedly use the services of "shell agents" simply to satisfy the legal
requirement, while retaining the bulk of the profits without spurring the agenting business.
116. Emily Chi, A Catch-22, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, at 44, 44 n.279 (2000).
This quandary is only one of many dilemmas facing aspiring artists who attempt to break into the
highly competitive and closed entertainment industry. See, e.g., id.
117. See Bart, supra note 9, at 56. As Peter Bart, editor of Variety and Daily Variety
reported, "a growing number of stars ... now retain both an agent and a manager... 'I like the
security of having both,' one ... aging actor confided. Now I have two guys who don't return
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of a charitable light, albeit one in the long-term interest of the manager. In
recent years, this process has matured into an elaborate enterprise with
enormous upside returns for many managers. 12 0 This enterprise, however,
introduces a number of complications into the relationships between clients
and their manager-producers. 12
C. California Regulations Governing Personal Representatives
Because Hollywood has long had a significant impact on the
California economy, the state legislature has promulgated a considerable
body of law to govern the entertainment industry. 122  While artists'
representatives exist in large part to shield their client's interests, courts
and legislative bodies have established many laws to protect artists from
being unduly influenced by their managers and agents. 123 Celebrities can
also rely upon legal protection from the principles of contract and fiduciary
duties. 124  California and New York, the two traditional centers of the
entertainment industry, took additional steps decades ago to enact specific
regulatory regimes to govern entertainment representatives.125
Although the interests of personal managers and talent agents overlap
inasmuch as both camps strive to nourish their golden geese, the law treats
the two groups very differently. Recent developments in the entertainment
industry have further blurred the lines between these two professions and
have strained the logical connection of these legal distinctions.
126
Documenting the current statutory scheme and its legislative history creates
a prism through which to evaluate the viability of maintaining these
differences and appraise possible solutions to the growing problems in the
representation industry. 127 While Tennessee, the archdiocese of country
music, and New York, are two states with significant bodies of law in this
area, this Article analyzes only California law, the reigning see of the
filmmaking industry.
120. See Percent, supra note 17, at 53.
121. See discussion infra Part Ill.
122. See generally REO Broad. Consultants v. Martin, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 639 (Ct. App.
1999); Waisbren v. Peppercorn Prod., 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 437 (Ct. App. 1995); Wachs v. Curry, 16
Cal. Rptr. 2d 496 (Ct. App. 1993).
123. See, e.g., WEILER, supra note 45, at 694.
124. See id.
125. Id.
126. See discussion infra Part III.A.
127. See generally Zarin, supra note 61, at 930.
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1. The Talent Agencies Act
The single most important piece of legislation affecting talent
representation in California is the Talent Agencies Act ("TAA"), ' 28 first
enacted as a remedial statute in 1913. The proliferation of tales involving
talent agents engaged in unscrupulous activities caused the California
Legislature to take notice of the industry early last century.' 29 The most
notorious accounts featured agents sending artists to work in hazardous
locations, sending female artists to brothels, arranging for minors to work
in bars and splitting fees with the owners of venues that booked the
artists.130 This practice of fee splitting involved the artist's agent furnishing
a dividend of her commission back to the individual who had booked the
artist in exchange for booking only artists represented by the agent.'
3'
Therefore, the artist was billed twice, once by the agent and again by the
employer. 32 Aside from the element of graft, this practice also effectively
shut the industry's door to artists not represented by agents in the game's
inner sanctum.
2. Legislative History of the Act
The California Legislature first attempted to remedy these concerns
by modifying the existing regulatory regime governing employment
agencies. 133 Seeking "to correct abuses that have long been recognized,"'
' 34
lawmakers in 1943 amended the Private Employment Agencies Law of
1913 to regulate talent agents and to proscribe outrageous behavior.' 3' This
amendment brought talent agents within the jurisdiction of the California
Labor Commissioner. 1
36
Sixteen years later, in 1959, the legislature responded to agents'
complaints that the existing scheme subjected them to rules not formulated
to address concerns particular to their vocation. 37 The Assembly severed
the regulations affecting them from the general regulatory scheme and
compiled them in a distinct section of the Labor Code, newly titled the
128. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1700-1700.47 (West 1999). See generally Edwin F. McPherson,
The Talent Agencies Act: Timefor a Change, 19 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 899 (1997).




133. See O'Brien, supra note 60, at 493-94; Zarin, supra note 61, at 943.
134. Waisbren v. Peppercorn Prod., 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 437, 441 (Ct. App. 1995).
135. See O'Brien, supra note 60, at 493-94.
136. See id. at 494.
137. See id.
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Artists' Managers Act.'38 This recodification signaled the entertainment
industry's ascendancy in California and the state lawmakers' recognition of
its importance. After a stint under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Employment Agencies beginning in 1967, talent agents returned to the
Labor Commissioner's bailiwick in 1978 when the Artists' Managers Act
was rechristened as the Talent Agencies Act, the name by which it
continues to be known today.
139
In 1982, the legislature revisited the TAA and promulgated a host of
regulations affecting its operation. One set of these new rules was a troika
of sunset provisions designed to expire four years later, on January 1, 1986,
unless the legislature elected to extend them. 140  The first of these
amendments allowed an unlicensed individual to act in conjunction with
and at the request of a licensed talent agent in the negotiation of an
employment contract.'14  The second exempted the procurement of
recording contracts from the application of the TAA. 14 2 The third provided
for a one-year statute of limitations to the Act.
14 3
The second set of 1982 amendments created the California
Entertainment Commission, the task of which was to study the
entertainment industry and to recommend revisions to the TAA. 44 After
two years, the Commission submitted its recommendations to the
legislature, which adopted them with minor language changes. 4
Specifically, the Commission suggested the sunset provisions appended to
the 1982 amendments be dissolved and the legislature adopt the regulations
permanently.146 The 1982 provisions remain good law today.
3. Operation of the Act
The TAA applies to any person who "engages in the occupation of
procuring, offering, promising or attempting to procure employment or
engagement for an artist. '147 A person engaging in the specified activity is
deemed a talent agent for the purposes of the Act and is brought under its
138. See id.
139. See O'Brien, supra note 60, at 494 (citing Act of Aug. 31, 1982, ch. 682, §§ 1-4, 1982
Cal. Stat. 2814-16 (codified at CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1700.4(a), 1700.44(c), 1700.44(d) (West
1999))).
140. Id.
141. See O'Brien, supra note 60, at 494.
142. See id.
143. See id.
144. See Zarin, supra note 61, at 945.
145. See id. at 946-47.
146. See O'Brien, supra note 60, at 495.
147. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.4(a) (West 1999).
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ambit. The TAA requires all such agents to obtain a license with the state,
post a bond and abide by several other orders. 148 This concomitant package
of statutory requirements demand affirmative adherence and threatens
punishment for failure to comply with the provisions of the Act.
Because of this increased regulatory scrutiny, personal managers and
other entertainment representatives are understandably eager to avoid
falling within the TAA's purview. Of course, simply not procuring
employment is one sure way to do so, but the precise contours of that
activity are hazy and much of the work of representation skirts its
boundaries because all parties are primarily interested in seeing the client
find work.'
49
Commentators have argued that inherent ambiguities in the
definitional clauses of the TAA fail to define "procurement" precisely.
This omission allows for a fair interpretation of the TAA that excuses
personal managers from its operation.'5 This argument has been made
unsuccessfully in various fora and has largely been dismissed by courts as
an avenue of relief for managers who are sued by their clients under the
Act.' 51 Indeed, in 1982, the same California Entertainment Commission
("CEC"), that had been established to evaluate the operation of the TAA,
suggested the Act be interpreted to apply to any person who engaged in
procurement activity, not simply talent agents.' 52 Before this ruling, the
debate over whether the broad language of the TAA applied only to agents
was unsettled.
The commission considered what activities an unlicensed individual
such as a personal manager or attorney could engage in when attempting to
find employment for an artist. The commission determined "there is no
such activity, that there are no such permissible limits, and that the
prohibitions of the Act over the activities of anyone procuring employment
for an artist without being licensed as a talent agent must remain, as they
are intended to be, total.""' No matter what one chooses to call oneself-
an agent, a manager or an attorney-the commission decisively concluded
soliciting employment for an artist will trigger the operation of the Act.
148. See id. §§ 1700.6-1700.22 (West 1999).
149. See Atzbach, supra note 51, at 81.
150. See, e.g., Chip Robertson, Don't Bite the Hand that Feeds: A Call for a Return to an
Equitable Talent Agencies Act Standard, 20 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 224 (1997).
151. See id. at 224-25.
152. See Zarin, supra note 61, at 946 & n.103.
153. O'Brien, supra note 60, at 495 (citing REPORT OF THE CALIFORNIA ENTERTAINMENT
COMMISSION TO THE GOVERNOR AND LEGISLATURE 11 (1985)).
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Only those complying with the TAA's full corpus of strictures can engage
in such behavior with impunity.
5 4
Recent decisions in the California courts have echoed and amplified
the commission's interpretation of the breadth of the Act. 55 These judicial
opinions have deemed the following behavior to constitute procurement
under the Act: introducing artists to producers or directors, initiating
contacts with employers, furthering an offer for an artist-client and
negotiating employment contracts. 56 These rulings clearly limit the scope
of activities in which a personal manager may engage while still advancing
an artist's career. The fact these regulations can so easily be called into
play, affecting broad swaths of representatives in the entertainment
business, highlights the importance of the Act's specific obligations.
a. Jurisdiction of the California Labor Commissioner
The first effect of the TAA is to authorize the Labor Commissioner's
jurisdiction over any disputes arising under the Act. Section 1700.44(a) of
the California Labor Code provides that the commissioner possesses
original and exclusive jurisdiction over all matters implicating the Act,
regardless of whether one of the parties is a licensed agent. 5 7 The reach of
the Act cannot be avoided, therefore, by simply failing to obtain a license.
An artist can force a personal manager or attorney to submit to the
commissioner's jurisdiction merely by charging that the representative has
engaged in activities that fit the definition of a talent agent according to the
Act. 58
b. The Arsenio Hall Lawsuit
In 1993, Arsenio Hall did just that when he successfully sued his
manager, Robert Wachs, for $2.12 million.159 Hall had entered a personal
management agreement in 1987 with the firm, X Management, of which
Wachs was a principal, and agreed to a commission rate of fifteen
percent. 160 Despite a clause in that agreement proclaiming that X
154. See id.
155. See, e.g., Mae v. Katz, 503 P.2d 1376 (Cal. 1972); REO, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 639;
Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 437; Wachs, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 496; Humes v. Margil Ventures, 220
Cal. Rptr. 156 (Ct. App.1985); Sinnamon v. McKay, 191 Cal. Rptr. 295 (Ct. App. 1983);
Buchwald v. Superior Court, 62 Cal. Rptr. 364 (Ct. App. 1967).
156. See cases cited supra note 155.
157. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.44(a).
158. See O'Brien, supra note 60, at 492.
159. Wachs, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 496; see also WEILER, supra note 45, at 706-08.
160. See Wachs, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 498.
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Management would in no way act as an agent for Hall, the firm procured
several employment engagements for him over the next few years.'
61
Among the jobs Wachs and his firm secured for Hall were his contract to
act in Coming to America'62 with Eddie Murphy, his deal with Paramount
Television for his own talk show, The Arsenio Hall Show,163 and a $1.5
million dollar promotional deal with Coca-Cola.164 Hall's relationship with
his managers soured in 1990 when he learned Wachs and another principal
of the firm were not only receiving screen credit as the producers of The
Arsenio Hall Show but were also collecting $5,000 a week for their
,,efforts." 165
In August 1990, Hall terminated his personal management agreement
with X Management and brought an action before the Labor
Commissioner.166 Hall alleged his contract was void ab initio because the
firm had acted as an unlicensed talent agent in violation of the Act. 67 The
Labor Commissioner agreed Wachs and his colleagues engaged in the
practice of procuring employment for Hall and directed X Management to
disgorge $2.12 million of the $2.62 million Hall paid them in
commissions. 168 The commissioner rejected X Management's estoppel and
waiver defenses based on Hall's awareness of what his managers had been
doing. The commissioner also found the Act did apply in cases where
major celebrities were concerned.
169
The Hall case illuminates several features of the TAA. First, it is the
Labor Commissioner, not the courts, that oversees the enforcement of the
Act. Although Wachs and X Management brought suit to challenge the
constitutionality of the Act in state court, they did so only after submitting
to the commissioner's decision in the initial administrative proceeding.
170
Second, the form of management contract does not control determinations
of an individual's status as a talent agent. In Hall, X Management recited
several sentences from its agreement with Hall that tracked the language of
the Act in an effort to assert that it had not engaged in procurement activity.
Needless to say, the commissioner found these recitations unconvincing
and looked instead to the pattern of activity in which the managers
161. See id.
162. COMING TO AMERICA (Paramount Pictures 1988).
163. Arsenio Hall Show (Paramount Domestic Television 1989).




168. See id. at 708.
169. See id.
170. See WEILER, supra note 45, at 708.
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engaged. The commissioner found that their activities warranted a
determination that X Management had acted as a talent agent without a
license.
71
c. The Administrative Hearing
The Labor Commissioner's hearing under the Act is an administrative
process initiated by the aggrieved party's filing of a petition to determine
controversy with the commissioner. 172 Much like a complaint, a copy of
the petition must be served on opposing counsel, who then has twenty days
to file an answer. The commissioner possesses the power to conduct an
independent investigation of the facts in dispute to make his own
determination as to whether a true controversy exists. 173  If the
commissioner finds no real dispute, he may dismiss the matter without a
hearing, certifying there exists no real controversy.
This administrative proceeding is presided over by a "hearing
officer," typically an attorney within the Division of Labor Standards
Enforcement. 74 If the matter is not settled, the hearing officer will hand
down a "Determination and Award.' ' 175 Similar to a judicial decision, the
Determination and Award describes the facts of the matter, the applicable
rules and rationale and grants an award if one is warranted. 176  The
unsuccessful party can challenge such a ruling in two ways. First, the
losing party may stay the execution of the judgment by posting a bond
pending ratification from the state trial court. Second, the losing party can
appeal the decision within ten days directly to the superior court for a de
novo hearing, albeit one in which the judge may rely upon exhibits from
the hearing. 177 As a procedural matter, section 1700.44(c) imposes a one-
year statute of limitations upon these actions, precluding the recovery of
fees and commissions paid before that time.178 Of course, this one-year
statute of limitations simply encourages managers to wait before bringing
suit.
The commissioner has wide discretion to craft remedies for violations
of the Act. 179 No remedy is more powerful than the nullification of all
171. See id. at 707.
172. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.44(a).
173. See id.




178. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.44(c).
179. See O'Brien, supra note 60, at 491.
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agreements entered into by the disputing parties. The decision to void one
of these contracts can result in a parade of horribles for the losing party: the
commissioner may proclaim that the agent is entitled to no further fees or
commissions; that the artist is not liable for any money advanced by the
agent to advance the artist's career; that the artist can collect all funds paid
to the offender under the contract; and that any collateral contracts
executed by the parties are void. While the commissioner may allow the
agent to retain certain funds in accordance with principles of quantum
meruit, 80 the overall effect of a hearing officer's adverse ruling under the
TAA can be financially devastating to an artist's representative.
Because the Act leaves the enforcement trigger in the hands of
aggrieved artists, it has been condemned both for providing insufficient
protections and for transferring too much power to artists. 81 Because the
Act is not self-executing, it fails to protect artists who live in fear of
retaliation from more powerful entities in the entertainment industry, such
as influential management firms. The multimillionaire celebrities-those
artists who arguably need the least protection from the Act-may be quick
to wield the Act as a powerful sword against representatives. Arsenio Hall,
for example, needed very little protection from remedial legislation to
ensure he was not imperiled by his representative. Hall was quick to
recoup millions of dollars once his relationship with X Management
soured.
d. Licensing Procedure
In addition to bestowing jurisdiction of these matters in the hands of
the Labor Commissioner, the Act also requires prospective agents to
undergo an application process to gain an agent's license.' 82 This process
involves an applicant's submission of their name, address and previous
occupations to the Labor Commissioner, as well as providing the same
information for all of their associates and partners.183 In the package,
applicants must include their fingerprints, two affidavits from members of
the community vouching for the applicant's "good moral character" and a
filing fee.' 84 Successful applicants must also pay an annual licensing fee.'
85
In addition to this financial outlay, agents must post a $10,000 surety bond
180. See id.
181. See generally Zarin, supra note 61.
182. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.6.
183. See id.
184. See CAL. LAB. CODE § § 1700.6(d), 1700.12 (West 1999).
185. See§ 1700.12.
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with the commissioner in accordance with section 1700.15.186 Much
decried by agents,' 87 this bond is designed to ensure some source of
recovery exists for judgments awarded to complaining parties when a
hearing officer determines that a licensed agent has violated the Act.
e. Business Operations
The TAA empowers the Labor Commissioner to order agents to
receive approval for the form contracts they use in their businesses.'
88
While this approval may be withheld only if the pact is "unfair, unjust and
oppressive to the artist,"' 89 this requirement imposes one more constriction
on the entrepreneurial freedom of licensed agents. Furthermore, agents are
also required to file with the commissioner a schedule of fees outlining the
amounts charged to clients and may not adjust these fees until seven days
after filing an updated schedule.' 90
Another directive for an agent's business practices delimits the
collection and disbursement of a client's funds. 19 1 Any funds an agent
receives on behalf of a client must be deposited in a trust fund and
disgorged to the artist within fifteen days of their receipt.' 92 Rather than
paying artists directly, employers such as studios and television production
companies typically dispatch payments for services rendered by the artist to
the agent, who takes the commission from the gross payment before
forwarding the balance to the client. 193 The Act requires agents to keep
records of their client's accounts, names, addresses, engagements,
compensation and fees collected, and to keep these records open to
inspection by the Labor Commissioner.194
The Act also contains specific provisions addressing the original
complaints that led to the initial promulgation of the TAA. Thus, section
1700.39 outlaws the splitting of fees between agents and employers;
section 1700.34 prohibits an agent from sending a minor to any place
186. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.15 (West 1999).
187. See Telephone Interview with Karen Stuart, Executive Director, Association of Talent
Agents (Jan. 27, 1999).
188. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.23-1700.41 (West 1999).
189. See § 1700.23.
190. § 1700.24 (West 1999).
191. See § 1700.25 (West 1999).
192. See id.
193. See Telephone Interview with Mike Macari, Talent Agent, United Talent Agency (Mar.
29, 1999).
194. See CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1700.23-1700.41.
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where alcohol is sold and consumed; and section 1700.33 bans agents from
dispatching clients to unsafe locations.
95
4. The "Incidental Procurement" Exception Under New York Law
The absence of an "incidental procurement" provision in the Act has a
large effect on artists' representatives. The New York Legislature has
enacted a regulatory scheme to govern the actions of talent agents that
differs in one key way from the TAA. In defining a "theatrical
employment agency," New York tracks much of the same language as
California but includes the following exception: "such term does not
include the business of managing such entertainments, exhibitions or
performances, or the artists or attractions constituting the same, where such
business only incidentally involves the seeking of employment therefor."',
96
This incidental booking exception, applicable only to representatives
who act as personal managers for artists, allows managers to engage in
procurement activities when such activities are ancillary to the primary task
of managing an artist's career. 197 This exception has been applauded by
several commentators who feel that it better acknowledges the realities of
the entertainment industry in which "any personal manager worth his or her
commission procures at least some employment for a client."'
98
Nevertheless, no such exception exists in California. This glaring omission
has been noted by courts that levy punishment on managers who have
made similar claims in their defense.' 99
California does, however, possess one clause not found in New York
law. This clause grants individuals not licensed under the TAA the ability
to act in conjunction with, and at the request of, a licensed talent agency in
the negotiation of an employment contract. 200 This provision occasionally
acts as a major loophole through which managers lawfully secure
employment contracts for their clients. Indeed, many agents lament the
ability of managers to find "shell" agents, whom they may involve in a
negotiation simply to satisfy the Act, while in reality orchestrating the deal
195. See id.
196. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 171(2)(e)(8) (McKinney 1988).
197. See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 170-190 (McKinney 1988).
198. See Gary A. Greenberg, The Plight of the Personal Manager in California: A
Legislative Solution, in COUNSELING CLIENTS IN THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY 1993, at 485
(PLI Pat., Copyrights, Trademarks and Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. G-3896,
1993).
199. See Waisbren, 148 Cal. Rptr. 2d 437; Wachs, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 496 at 502-04.
200. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.44(d).
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themselves.20 ' Of course, agents can combat this practice by emphasizing
the uniqueness of their role to the client, making it clear that it is their job
to procure employment, not the manager's.
D. The Entertainment Guilds
The entertainment industry is one of the most heavily unionized
sectors of commerce in the American economy. These unions, or "guilds"
as they are known, are responsible for a large corpus of private law
202regulating the activities of many of the industry's players. Agents,
therefore, must not only comport their activities with controlling state law,
but must also comply with regulations enacted by the Screen Actors Guild
("SAG"), the Writers Guild of America, the Directors Guild of America, °3
the American Federation of Television and Radio Artists and the American
Federation of Musicians. 204 By representing the interests of Hollywood's
most valuable asset, the talent, these guilds have exacted a great deal of
concessions from other industry players through their collective bargaining
agreements. 20 5 These agreements now function as a separate but equally
important body of entertainment law, and since the 1920's, the unions have
endeavored to establish standards to govern the agents who represent their
members.
1. The Effect of Guild Regulations
Agents must comply with the proscriptions of the unions for one
simple reason: the union members refuse to do business with anyone except
agents who are "franchised" by the guilds.20 6 For an agent to acquire and
maintain a franchise with any given union, that agent must comply with the
terms of their agreements.20 7 Many of those terms govern the behavior of
agents more extensively than do state laws. Some of the most important
provisos require agents to obtain a franchise license from the guild, limit
201. See CAL. LAB. CODE. §§ 1700.4-1700.44.
202. See Chi, supra note 116, at 43-44.
203. Directors Guild of America, DGA Membership Benefits (visited Feb. 29. 2000
<http://www.dga.org/dga-info.member.html>.
204. See Chi, supra note 116, at 43--44.
205. See id.
206. See id.
207. See Screen Actors Guild, 1998 Theatrical Motion Pictures & Television Contract
Summary (visited Feb. 29, 2000) <http://www.sag.com/theatrical-tv.html>.
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the percentage an agent may charge a union member and obligate the agent
to use standardized contracts.2 °8
Perhaps the most famous guild regulation that agents must obey is the
rule that they cannot collect a commission of more than ten percent of an
artist's gross earnings for their services. 209 This regulation explains why
agencies are commonly referred to as "tenpercentaries" in the industry
patois. Another important union limitation on agents affects the duration of
their contracts with artists: agents are usually allowed to sign talent for
only one year at a time.2 10  This rule may create a somewhat tenuous
relationship between artists and agents, but it allows the artist to escape an
ill-advised agreement within a relatively short amount of time and creates
an incentive for agents to procure the best work possible for their clients if
they hope to renew their deals at the end of the year. In contrast, the TAA
contains no strictures governing the length of contracts, although the
California Labor Code does limit all contracts for personal services to
seven years.21
Perhaps the most important guild regulation affecting agents is the
prohibition against an agent's ownership of any equity interest in a guild
member.212 This rule translates into a bar against agents producing the
work of their clients. This practice has recently burgeoned into an
extremely profitable enterprise for individuals such as personal managers
who are not governed by guild regulations.1 3 The origin of this rule dates
back to the first half of this century when agencies such as WMA and the
Music Corporation of America ("MCA") dominated the industry.2 4
208. See Screen Actors Guild, Contracts, Wage & Working Conditions (visited Feb. 29,
2000) <http://www.sag.com/contracts.html>.
209. See Telephone Interview with Mike Macari, Talent Agent, United Talent Agency (Mar.
29, 1999). There are, however, upward departures from this number for deals involving
musicians. See Hal I. Gilenson, Badlands: Artist-Personal Manager Conflicts of Interest in the
Music Industry, 9 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 501, 511 n.48 (1991).
210. See Telephone Interview with Mike Macari, Talent Agent, United Talent Agency (Mar.
29, 1999).
211. See O'Brien, supra note 63.
212. See Screen Actors Guild, 1998 Theatrical Motion Pictures & Television Contract
Summary (visited Feb. 29, 2000) <http://www.sag.com/theatrical-tv.html>.
213. See Dave McNary, A Snag in ATA Deal With SAG, VARIETY, Feb. 28, 2000, at 6.
Additional SAG regulations prohibit talent agencies, but not management companies, from
owning or being owned by production and media companies. These rules effectively make it
impossible for talent agents to tap into the explosive opportunities of the Internet, since they
cannot partner with dot-coins or advertising agencies. See id. Despite heated attempts to
renegotiate these terms with SAG, the ATA has failed to have these restrictions lifted. See id.
214. See ROSE, supra note 70, at 194-95.
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2. The Emergence of Guild Regulations
MCA was founded by Jules Stein in the same decade as WMA215 but,
led by Stein's successor Lew Wasserman, quickly eclipsed its competitor to
become the leading agency in Hollywood.216 In addition to acquiring ten
percent of his clients' earnings, Wasserman maneuvered MCA into a
position from which it could take ownership interests in its stars' films and
television shows.21 7 This practice irked artists and their guilds because
agents profited wildly from owning and producing the fruits of their artists'
labors.
218
In 1938, SAG forced the agents to relinquish this right vis-d-vis films
in a negotiation with the talent agents, who were represented by Abe
Lastfogel. 219 Lastfogel acquiesced to SAG's demand that agents not act as
both artist representatives and motion picture producers. 220 In 1952, SAG
sought to extend this prohibition to television shows and did so
successfully, with one exception.22' On the strength of their personal
relationship, Lew Wasserman convinced his friend and client, Ronald
Reagan then the head\of SAG, to exclude MCA from the prohibition
against producing television shows.222 For ten years, MCA profited greatly
in its safe harbor until it lost its preferred status in 1962. The Justice
Department, led by Robert F. Kennedy, instituted an antitrust investigation
of MCA and ultimately prodded Wasserman into abandoning agency
work.223 Since then, MCA has confined its business to the production of
films, television shows and music recordings. All talent agents have since
operated without the luxury of being able to produce.
E. The Free Province of the Personal Manager
Personal managers have enjoyed a very different history of regulation
from that of the agents. In fact, neither the states nor the entertainment
guilds have promulgated rules to govern managers. Indeed, the only law
managers need to concern themselves with is the TAA,224 when they flirt
215. See WEILER, supra note 45, at 692.
216. See id. at 692.




221. See Star Wars, supra note 4, at 158.
222. See id.
223. See id.
224. See discussion supra Part II.C. 1.
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with procuring employment. To avoid the appearance of unlicensed talent
agents, many managers will include provisions in their agreements
specifically stating they will not procure employment for their clients.225
Of course, both the CEC and courts have repeatedly concluded the acts of
these managers, not their contractual recitations, determine whether they
are operating as agents under the TAA.226
Some managers resent this interpretation because it seems to
disregard many of the actualities of what managers do for their clients.
227
Those who would protect managers now protest what they describe as the
"ineluctable choice" between continuing to pursue their business as they
would like and having to revise their business practices heavily. 228 These
managers resent the risk of "having their management agreements
invalidated by the Labor Commissioner" or submitting to the TAA's
licensing scheme. 229 They also protest "subjecting themselves to the Act's
provisions and alerting the unions that because they have procured or
intend to procure employment for artists, union fee ceilings and other
regulations should become operative against them.,
230
The "Scylla and Charybdis' '231 scenario, these apologists lament,
exaggerates the extent to which the current situation is a dilemma for
232managers. 2 Personal managers can avoid the quandary in two ways: they
can adhere to those elements of the profession in which they have
particular expertise, allowing agents to handle the actual negotiation and
procurement of contracts; or they can take advantage of section 1700.44(d)
to work in conjunction with a licensed agent to find and close deals.
Because managers and management firms earn vast profits through
producing their client's work, a right agents do not share, some agents scoff
at managers' dirges lamenting the TAA's financial handcuffs.233 The
managers are maintaining that these complaints have no real basis in
today's entertainment market.234
225. See Wachs, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 498.
226. See discussion supra Part II.C.3.
227. See Telephone Interviews with Manya Klempner, Talent Manager, The Firm (Jan. 15,
1999 & Mar. 29, 1999).
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. O'Brien, supra note 60, at 484.
231. See Telephone Interviews with Manya Klempner, Talent Manager, The Firm (Jan. 15
1999 & Mar. 29, 1999).
232. Id.
233. See Telephone Interview with Karen Stuart, Executive Director, Association of Talent
Agents (Jan. 27, 1999).
234. See id.
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Although managers are not specifically regulated by state laws or
guild regulations targeting their activities, there are certain ambient
limitations on particular aspects of their businesses. The maximum length
of management agreements, for example, is capped by a state labor
regulation limiting all personal service contracts to seven years.235  This
state law is rarely relevant, however, as most managers execute agreements
spanning only three to five years.23 6 Similarly, managers are not subject to
the guild regulations limiting an agent's commission to ten percent of an
artist's gross revenues. As a result, a manager's fees may range as high as
fifteen to twenty-five percent to compensate them for their greater
involvement in an artist's life.
237
III. THE CONFLICTS QUANDARY: WHEN MANAGERS ACT AS PRODUCERS
He's f--king with our business! It's got to be stopped! Ovitz must be
stopped.
238
The [Shandling] suit is sheer lunacy.
239
In January 1998, celebrated comedian Garry Shandling filed suit in a
Los Angeles Superior Court against his friend and personal manager of
eighteen years, Brad Grey, seeking damages in the amount of $100
million.240 Six weeks later, Grey returned the favor by counterclaiming for
$10 million. 241 The final exchange of shots in a tense duel that had been
brewing for a number of years, this unhappy repartee also illustrates many
235. See CAL. LABOR CODE § 2885 (West 1999).
236. See Telephone Interview with Karen Stuart, Executive Director, Association of Talent
Agents (Jan. 27, 1999).
237. See Telephone Interviews with Manya Klempner, Talent Manager, The Firm (Jan. 15,
1999 & Mar. 29, 1999).
238. Star Wars, supra note 4, at 154 (quoting an anonymous CAA agent reacting to Ovitz's
return to the representation business) (internal quotation marks omitted).
239. Joe Flint, Hey, Now! Garry Shandling Shocks Hollywood with his $100 Million Suit
Against Former Manager Brad Grey, ENT. WEEKLY, Feb. 6, 1998, at 16 (quoting Grey's
Attorney, Bertram Fields).
240. See Flint, supra note 239, at 16.
241. See Answer for Defendants, Shandling v. Grey, BC 184316 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Mar.
4, 1998); see also Answer to First Amended Complaint for Defendants, Shandling v. Grey, BC
184316 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed July 29, 1998); Defendants Cross-Complaint, Shandling v. Grey,
BC 184316 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Mar. 4, 1998); Garry Shandling Hit with $10 Million Cross-
Complaint, ENT. LITIG. REP., Mar. 31, 1998, at 4; Michael Fleming, Grey Counters Shandling
Suit, DAILY VARIETY, Mar. 5, 1998, at 1.
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of the complaints that have surfaced about the new roles personal mangers
are playing in the entertainment industry today.242
At the heart of the Shandling lawsuit was the greater issue of the
freedom of personal managers. 243 Managers now enjoy many of the same
privileges agents did at their apex under the leadership of Lew Wasserman
before the Justice Department broke MCA's hold over talent and
production in 1962.24 Many of the same problems deplored at that time
are resurfacing. These criticisms are hurled afresh at managers as they
form more production affiliates to produce their artists' films and television
shows while continuing to act as these same client's representatives.
Unlike Wasserman, managers today have not been forced to choose
between representing artists or owning interests in artists' products. This
involvement in both areas creates a slew of conflicts of interest.
A. A Growing Problem
When a personal manager's role expands to include producing or
otherwise acquiring an equitable interest in a client's work, the manager's
interests immediately conflict with the client' s.245  When doubling as a
producer, a manager will sometimes act on behalf of the entity that has
retained producing services, and on other occasions, on behalf of the
manager's own producing career. These conflicts, in turn, open the door to
a host of problems in the client-manager relationship. At its most basic
level, this issue is a function of the fact that a manager cannot loyally serve
three masters at once: the artist, the artist's employer and the manager
acting as an independent producer. Talent agents, in contrast, avoid both
the profits and the perils of producing because of the guilds' prohibitions
against engaging in such activity.
246
242. See Peter Bart, Manager-Producers: Life in the Grey Zone, DAILY VARIETY, Jan. 26,
1998, at 26.
243. See Telephone Interview with Peter Haviland, Attorney for Garry Shandling (Feb. 10,
1999).
244. See discussion supra Part II.C.2.
245. See generally Stephen P. Clark, Main Line v. Basinger and the Mixed Motive
Manager: Reexamining the Agent's Privilege to Induce Breach of Contract, 46 HASTINGS L.J.
609 (1995).
246. See James Bates, Pact Between Agents, SAG Hits Potentially Fatal Snag, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 8, 2000, at C8. Ironically, agents are the first to point out the conflicts of interest in the way
managers currently conduct their business, and the first to demand the same privilege for
themselves. Talent agents, obviously not content with this regulatory imbalance, are not just
hoping the guilds will regulate managers up to their level; rather, they have taken affirmative
steps to remove guild regulations that limit the producing activities of talent agents. Recent
efforts to level the playing field have failed, however, as SAG has backed away from such
proposals. See id.
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1. Producing
The term "producing" no longer carries much meaning in the
entertainment industry.247 Originally, the producer was the individual who
brought together the vital ingredients of a film and then acted as the
production's chairman of the board, leaving most of the creative control to
the director as chief executive officer. In recent years, the title has been
diluted rendered meaningless by the promiscuousness with which it is used.
Films now feature credits for producers, executive producers, line
producers and associate producers. Furthermore, the number of individuals
in each of these categories has multiplied enormously.
Mourners of this development complain "[t]he proliferation of
producing credits is a proliferation of control and that means no control if
you have an exorbitant number of producers running around on a
project. ' '248 Indeed, the Producers Guild of America ("PGA") has authored
a statement, signed by 500 of its members, proposing guidelines that will
limit the use of producing credits. 249 Compliance with PGA guidelines is
entirely voluntary.25 ° Unlike SAG and other entertainment guilds, the PGA
is not recognized as a union by the studios. In 1983, the National Labor
Relations Board ("NLRB") rejected the PGA's petition for union status,
finding its members were supervisors and managerial employees.25'
Relying on this NLRB ruling, the studios have not recognized the PGA as
the collective bargaining representative for producers.252
The unchecked producer mitosis stems from a variety of interrelated
factors. 3 One aggravating condition has been the rise in almost all sectors
of the entertainment industry of individuals forming agreements to consult
with their creative leaders. A script writer, therefore, may agree to work on
a project only if the writer's associate is appended to the project as a
producer. In order to secure the services of the writer, the studio must
comply with demands to add another producer to the credits. A related
outcome of this phenomenon is that personal managers who consult closely
with artists on a variety of topics are able to persuade many of their clients
not to take on projects unless the managers serve as producers.254
,247. See Kit, supra note 17, at 4.





253. See Telephone Interviews with Manya Klempner, Talent Manager, The Firm (Jan. 15,
1999 & Mar. 29, 1999).
254. See id.
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Personal managers persuade their artists to solicit these concessions
from the project's underwriters with a two-pronged argument. First,
personal managers suggest the practice will save the artist money. The
arrangement begins with an agreement stating the manager will not take a
commission if a studio pays the manager a producer's fee. Artists are
happy to force studios to pick up the tab, as they would rather not pay a
commission if they can avoid so. Second, managers suggest that it is in the
interest of an artist to have a confederate on the set to argue for the artist's
demands in disputes with the production entity. In the absence of contrary
advice, artists have no objection to toting their managers along as
producers on their television shows or films.
Producing is very profitable for managers because it typically allows
them to receive an equitable interest in the production itself. Rather than
simply receiving a fixed percentage of the artist's fee, a manager-producer
may share in the profits of hugely successful television shows or films.
Indeed, the largest management firms have now begun to create their own
television shows by bringing together a team of their own talented writers,
directors and actors. In these operations, managers do in fact carry out
producing functions, such as investing funds in the venture and overseeing
its development. Managers therefore represent the interests of the
production entity more than those of the artist and in effect operate as
managers qua studio representatives.
Great swaths of freshly anointed producers do no actual producing of
any kind, however, because "[i]n many cases, credited producers never set
foot on the set, or fail to perform any of the normal producing functions. 2 5
In these situations, the manager never becomes a true agent of the
production entity and usually receives a one-time producer's fee, but does
not necessarily act as the artist's earnest advocate. This type of
representative is a manager qua titular producer. These two different
breeds of manager-turned-producers create their own unique conflict of
interest for their clients.
2. The Proliferation of Personal Managers
The practice of managers producing a client's work create inherent
conflicts of interest damaging to that business relationship; 256 moreover,
those problems are on the verge of greatly expanding. Perhaps no single
trend in the entertainment business is more remarkable these days than the
255. Id.
256. See discussion supra Part III.
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massive influx of individuals into the management profession.215 7 What
was once the ugly stepchild to the glamorous agenting profession258 has
now become the hottest role in Los Angeles. Indeed, the erstwhile fiber-
agent, Ovitz himself, has announced his reincarnation as a player in the
business with the ostentatious launch of his new management firm, Artists
Management Group ("AMG").
259
Ovitz has convinced a number of individuals-several of whom have
left positions as agents26°0to serve as managers under the AMG aegis.
261
In recent months, the trade publications have reported a deluge of new
262managers and agents-turned-managers, heralding the ascendancy of the
position of manager. This exodus is symptomatic of the enormous
financial benefits of management, 263 which Hollywood's business elite are
only now beginning to exploit. This seismic shift brings with it a
magnification of all of the problems afflicting the management profession.
The ability of managers to produce a client's work has become such a
profitable enterprise 264 that it has metamorphosed the role of the personal
manager from an unsavory chore of client hand-holding to an enticing
vision of filthy lucre. The droves of recent converts from agenting to
managing have not come as a result of their desire to coddle artists.
Instead, they have become aware of the sheer magnitude of production
profits and want to partake.
Closely associated with the financial element of management is the
reputational value of producing.265  Naturally, producing provides
additional revenue to the manager, but it also carries with it an independent
social cachet. Receiving credit on a successful television show or film is
gratifying to even the most jaded ego. Credits have distinct currency value
in Hollywood, indeed, their size and location in films and on advertising
posters have long been negotiated in an artist's employment contract.
266
257. See, e.g., Bernard Weinraub, Ovitz Shakes Hollywood with New Coup, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 25, 1999, at C7.
258. See Star Wars, supra note 4, at 156.
259. See Chris Petrikin & Michael Fleming, Ovitz Ready to Unveil His New Banner, AMG,
DAILY VARIETY, Dec. 2, 1995, at 1.
260. See, e.g., Claudia Eller, CAA Loses Agent-and Top Star-to Ovitz, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 21,
1999, at C5.
261. See Chris Petrikin, AMG Nets Two More Managers, DAILY VARIETY, Mar. 9, 1999, at
5.
262. See id.; Petrikin, supra note 259, at 27.
263. See Weinraub, supra note 257.
264. See id.
265. See generally Kit, supra note 17.
266. See id. at 28.
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Agents are unable to obtain credits, but managers can appear as producers
in almost all new film and television productions.
Another incentive for remaking one's self as a manager is that the
conversion carries almost no transaction costs. In fact, many managers are
accused of violating the TAA by acting as unlicensed talent agents. For
agents who remake themselves as managers, this is also true. Agents have
long accused managers of procuring work in violation of the TAA, as well
as enjoying all the other benefits of managing clients. Agents have also
fingered the guilds as accomplices in the unlawful actions. Agents have
accused SAG of not enforcing the guild restrictions against artists that do
business with managers who act as enfranchised agents.267 The extent of
these violations is impossible to ascertain, but it is safe to conclude that a
great deal of agents who now operate as managers perform many of the
same tasks as they have in the past, including procuring their clients'
employment.
3. The Deluge: Michael Ovitz v. Creative Artists Agency
With all these benefits to acting as a manager, many savvy individuals
have sought to capitalize on the regulatory disparity between the two
professions. The story of Michael Ovitz's return to the entertainment
industry is an excellent illustration of the new status managers enjoy in
Hollywood. 268  This tale is almost theatrical-replete with elements of
classical Greek drama--and has been acted out on the front pages of
Variety and The Hollywood Reporter.269
Beginning in the lower echelons of WMA, Ovitz developed a
successful career before leaving to form Creative Artists Agency in
1970s.270 At CAA, Ovitz transformed the role of agents and the clout of
271celebrities, raising both his agency and himself to the pinnacle of power.
He engineered such monumental deals as Matsushita's purchase of MCA
and Sony's sale to Columbia Pictures.272 Not satiated with representing
celebrities, Ovitz expanded his domain to include the representation of
267. See Telephone Interview with Karen Stuart, Executive Director, Association of Talent
Agents (Jan. 27, 1999) (outlining the perspectives of many talent agents on the legislative
developments aimed at personal managers).
268. See generally Richard Thomson, Ovitz Signs Up the Stars for His Hollywood
Comeback, EVENING STANDARD, Dec. 11, 1998, at 45.
269. See Weinraub, supra note 257, at 11.
270. See Star Wars, supra note 4, at 160.
271. See generally O'Brien, supra note 60.
272. See Star Wars, supra note 4, at 160.
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global corporations such as Coca-Cola and Nike.273 Then in 1995, Ovitz
abruptly left the agency he had created to become the president of
Disney.274 Fourteen months later, however, he was fired by his former
friend and boss, Michael Eisner. In just under two years, the mighty
Michael Ovitz had plummeted into ignominy.27 5
While he did manage to salvage a $100 million severance package
from Disney, he had been humiliated by the Disney debacle, and his
reputation was tarnished. Things would seemingly only get worse for him.
He made an abortive attempt to purchase Polygram before investing in the
Canadian theatrical company, Livent.276 Although Livent has created such
Broadway hits as Ragtime, Fosse and Showboat, after Ovitz came aboard,
the company promptly devolved into "bankruptcy, litigation, and
allegations of egregious fraud.', 2 77 Ovitz was not accused of precipitating
this collapse, only of making a poor investment decision. Nevertheless, his
Midas touch clearly seemed newly leaden. Amidst this embarrassment, he
involved himself in a failed bid with the National Football League to bring
a football franchise to Los Angeles.
278
None of the recent history could have prepared Hollywood for Ovitz's
next move. In November 1998, he unveiled his latest venture AMG.2 7 9 By
luring two of the hottest managers in the entertainment business and their
star-studded client lists to work with him, 280 Ovitz crafted a lavish debut for
his new management firm.28' Rick Yom would bring Leonardo
DiCaprio,282 Claire Danes and Cameron Diaz to AMG. Yom's sister-in-
law, Julie Silverman Yorn, imported her clients, Samuel L. Jackson, Steve






278. See Star Wars, supra note 4, at 160.
279. See Petrikin & Fleming, supra note 259, at 1.
280. See Stephen Galloway, Duo Closer to Ovitz "s Artists, HOLLYWOOD REP., Dec. 3, 1998,
at 38.
281. See Chris Petrikin, Clients Walk, Not Run, to Ovitz "s New Agency, VARIETY, Jan. 11-
17, 1999, at 4.
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assembled both a workforce and a client roster from all over the
entertainment industry.
2 84
One of the boldest moves Ovitz made was converting CAA agent
Mike Menchel to an AMG manager, simultaneously capturing Menchel's
star client, Robin Williams.285 Many agencies feared Ovitz's design was
not to build a management firm with whom the agencies could work
cooperatively, but rather an agency cloaked in management trappings.
286
This nefarious scheme would lead to clients choosing AMG at the expense
of their existing agency rather than in conjunction with it. In this
apprehensive atmosphere, CAA interpreted the Menchel "defection" as a
hostile act, 287 and in a stunning announcement, the agency declared war
with AMG.288
Ignoring the traditional scenario in which an artist uses the services of
both a manager and an agent, CAA stated that it would no longer represent
any client managed by AMG. 289 The agency was making a bold move, in
which it risked losing the business of Danes and Driver,29° as well as other
major figures such as Martin Scorsese29' and Marisa Tomei.292 But for the
"Young Turks" who now run CAA,293 Ovitz's actions constituted an
intolerable threat.
294
For agents, the specter that AMG raised was one of total
destruction.295 "He's come to kill them," warned a WMA agent. 296 This
284. See Claudia Eller, Gotham Animation Group Joins Ovitz's New Company, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 25, 1999, at C2; Phyllis Furman, Ovitz in the Hunt for Disney Talent, DAILY NEWS, Feb. 10,
1999, at 30.
285. See Claudia Eller, CAA Loses Agent - and Top Star - to Ovitz, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 21,
1999, at C5.
286. See generally Weinraub, supra note 257.
287. See Stephen Galloway, War's Declared: All Ovitz and CAA Share is Hostility,
HOLLYWOOD REP. Jan. 26-Feb. 1, 1999, at 4, 90.
288. See Josh Chetwynd, A Power Squeeze in Hollywood, USA TODAY, Jan. 26, 1999, at
2D; Weinraub, supra note 257, at CI.
289. See Josh Chetwynd, Ovitz, CAA Keep Firing in Talent Turf War, USA TODAY, Mar. 3,
1999, at 4D.
290. Id.
291. See Chris Petrikin, Scorsese, Levinson Sign with Ovitz-headed AMG, VARIETY, Jan.
18, 1999, at 37.
292. See generally Michelle Caruso, Ontz Conquers, Divides, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Mar. 11,
1999.
293. See King, supra note 86.
294. See generally Claudia Eller, Creative Artists Counter Punches in Ovitz Fight, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 29, 1999, at C1.
295. See Stephen Galloway & David Robb, The Great CAA-Ovitz War: Whose Side Are
You On?, BPI ENT. NEWS WIRE, Jan. 27, 1999.
296. Star Wars, supra note 4, at 167.
2000]
532 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:493
source predicted Ovitz's method would convince all his clients that they
had no need for an agent when a lawyer could procure employment for
only five percent.297 All an artist would need then would be a manager to
represent his interests. Agents feared that Ovitz would redesign the
architecture of the entire industry, killing the progeny he had left in charge
of CAA and raising his new profession to the entertainment throne.
Not surprisingly, Ovitz denies any such drama and professes sadness
at CAA's decision, saying, "[w]e built that business, gave these guys
everything they wanted, nurtured them, helped them sign clients. It's just
unfortunate that it had to come to this. 298 Nevertheless, the prominence of
these hostilities has legitimized the newfound strength of managers. Ovitz
continues to add managers to his ranks and to convert agents into AMG
managers. Of course, AMG has launched its own production arm,299 and
with each new AMG manager comes the inherent conflicts of interests with
producers.
Ovitz and AMG are not, however, the only fount of new managers in
Hollywood. Other management firms have burgeoned all over Los
Angeles, and AMG is merely illustrative of an industry-wide trend.300 The
true damage that manager-producers ultimately wreak will be a function of
the cumulative effect of a massive new population of individuals
purporting to represent artists while simultaneously producing the artist's
work. Indeed, if an agent's worst fears are realized and Ovitz strikes a
death blow to agencies, the problems will only increase for artists. After
all, the presence of several individuals representing an artist generates a
separation of powers that acts in large part as a check on abuses by one. If
agents do die out as a breed, or even simply diminish, managers will
become more and more powerful in the lives of their clients. Even
assuming managers are not acting as unlicensed agents by procuring
297. See id.
298. Id.
299. Ovitz is making deals to expand AMG's business activities into various areas of the
economy. Beginning with musical talent, he has made overtures to represent artists such as Puffy
Combs, Busta Rhymes and Q-Tip. See George Rush, et al., Puffy & Ovitz Talking Teamwork,
N.Y. DAILY NEWS, August 15, 1999, at 20; Phyllis Furman, Ovitz Eyes Hip-Hop Alliance, N.Y.
DAILY NEWS, July 14, 1999. In a more radical expansion, however, he has also developed
connections with internet companies such as AskJeeves.com and Scour.net. See Ken Woo,
Jeeves Gets a Hollywood Agent, NEWSBYTES, Oct. 28, 1999. See generally Bruce Orwall, Mr.
Hollywood Plugs in to the Internet, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 1999, at 6.
300. The entry costs to the management industry are low relative to those of talent agents,
especially given the commensurate, if not greater, returns. "Management can mean less internal
politics; as much money (or more) as agenting, with fewer clients; no more demands from agency
brass to poach sought-after talent; and you get to see your name on the screen." Chris Petrikin,
Percent Dissent Foments, DAILY VARIETY, Oct. 16, 1998, at 1; see also N.Y. Gets the Picture:
Ovitz's AMG Is Here, VARIETY, Mar. 15, 1999, at 4.
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employment, clients will continue to suffer the effects of severe conflicts of
interest when managers produce.
B. The Garry Shandling Lawsuit
One particularly high-profile lawsuit, involving Garry Shandling's
"It's Garry Shandling's Show," illustrates the conflicts of interest created
by personal managers who decide to produce their clients' work.30' Brad
Grey served as an involved producer on the show and was influential as a
sounding board for Shandling's script ideas.30 2  The show was a critical
success and ran for four years on Showtime and during the last two years
was also broadcast on Fox.303 After the show went off the air in 1990,
development executives from both cable and network companies courted
Shandling, encouraging him to create another show.3 4
In 1992, Home Box Office landed Shandling and his new show, The
Larry Sanders Show.30 5  Initially, Grey took an active role in the
development of the new series as executive producer. By the end of the
final season in 1998,306 however, Grey had diverted much of his attention
to nurturing new shows managed by Brillstein-Grey. °7 Former Larry
Sanders Show writers, Paul Simms and Steve Levitan, had left the show to
create their own television comedies, News Radio and Just Shoot Me,
respectively. 30 8  Grey invested much of his energy in writers, nurturing
these shows, and Shandling allegedly resented it.30 9 As one former writer
on The Larry Sanders Show described the situation, "Garry wanted a
manager, which is what Brad was, and Brad wanted to be a mogul. They
were out of sync. 310
301. See Lynette Rice, Shandling, Grey in $100 Mil Suit, HOLLYWOOD REP., Jan. 16, 1998,
at 1, 120. Garry Shandling and Brad Grey were introduced to one another in 1979 through their
mutual friend, Bob Saget. See Lynn Hirschberg Garry Shadling Goes Dark, N.Y. TIMES MAG.,
May 31, 1998, at 50. Grey later became Saget's manager. Saget knew Shandling as a fellow
stand-up comedian. See id. Grey became Shandling's manager and the two quickly became good
friends, vacationing together in Hawaii and confiding in one another. In 1986, Shandling




305. See Scott Collins & Lynette Rice, It's Garry Shandling's Suit, HOLLYWOOD REP., Feb.
17, 1998, at 14.
306. See Ray Richmond, Shandling Takes Air Out of Sanders, VARIETY, Jan. 26, 1998, at
35.
307. See Hirschberg, supra note 301, at 50.
308. See id.
309. See id.
310. Id. (quotations omitted).
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The tension between Shandling and Grey mounted considerably once
Grey grew tired of his role as strictly a personal manager.311 In 1992, Grey
began to expand his domain in the entertainment business and took a more
active role in producing his clients' shows. "He was sick of the 2 a.m. calls
from some unhappy comedian," said one network executive. 312  "He
wanted a different role in life., 313 Grey began to produce more television
shows and films starring Brillstein-Grey clients. 314  Soon thereafter,
Shandling began to doubt Grey's dedication to Shandling's work.31 5
One issue disputed in the recent litigation was whether Shandling had
independent counsel representing his interests. Shandling claims he asked
Grey why Shandling did not have separate legal representation. Grey
allegedly replied, "[d]on't you trust me?, 31 6 Although Grey denies this
remark, in 1997 Shandling retained Barry Hirsch as his attorney.317 Hirsch
had difficulty retrieving requested documents from Grey. When he
eventually saw some files, he was alarmed by what he saw.318  In
Shandling's complaint accused Grey of double-dipping by taking an
executive producer fee of The Larry Sanders Show as well as commissions
on Shandling's compensation from the show.319
Only on the cusp of trial did the lawsuit settle. Several commentators
suggested had the case made it to trial, it would have lasting implications
for managers.320 They believed Shandling had evidence showing that Grey
had taken advantage of him financially. Despite Grey's assertion
"[Shandling's] case doesn't look like a case to me," other insiders
predicted, "Brad will settle.",32'1 Although the case settled, however, the law
suit still serves as a stark illustration of the complications that arise out of
managers producing their clients' work. When $110 million was riding on
the outcome, the case attracted the attention of all Hollywood's major
players.
322
311. See Telephone Interview with Peter Haviland, Attorney for Garry Shandling (Feb. 10,
1999).
312. Hirschberg, supra note 301, at 51.
313. Id.
314. See generally Collins & Rice, supra note 305.
315. See id.
316. Hirschberg, supra note 301, at 51.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Plaintiffs Amended Complaint, Shandling v. Grey, BC 184316 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed
June 23, 1998).
320. Shandling Case Reset for Friday, DAILY VARIETY, July 1, 1999, at 4.
321. Hirschberg, supra note 301, at 52.
322. See generally Claudia Eller & Brian Lowry, Bitter Shandling-Grey Break-Up Strikes a
Nerve in Hollywood, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1998, at D1.
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C. A Catalog of Conflicts
The Shandling lawsuit provides a narrative background upon which
particular conflicts of interest can be examined. Assuming Shandling's
allegations were true, Grey's behavior illustrates the problems created
when a personal manager expands his role beyond the discrete
considerations of an artist's best interests. The litigation raised three
particular conflicts of interest.
1. The Janus 32 3 Conflict: Artist versus Manager qua Studio Representative
An artist retains a personal manager to develop the artist's career and
to represent the artist's interest in dealings with third parties.324 When a
manager becomes the species of producer that actually performs the duties
of a producer and shares in the profitable returns of the production, the
manager becomes affiliated with the production entity. This production
entity will need to negotiate basic contractual issues with the artist,
including: a salary; the number of episodes in which the artist will appear
in the case of a television performance; and amenities the artist will enjoy
on the set. If the producer-manager receives an equity interest in the profits
of the show, the producer-manager will have an interest in limiting the
outlays of the production. Consequently, artists lose their personal
defenders when managers become producers qua studio representatives, as
no one remains to champion their interests.
To justify this egregious violation of a manager's fiduciary obligation
to the client, producers marshal a variety of counterarguments. 325 First,
they point out the many benefits of allowing managers to invest in their
clients' product. Arguably, if managers were prohibited from doing so,
many undiscovered artists would never break onto the public stage as their
talents would lie dormant and untapped without a benefactor to build them
a stage on which to display their gifts. Indeed, managers are those taking
the greatest risk by investing in underdeveloped artists well before anyone
is willing to give them a break. Second, the interests of managers and
artists are often aligned, as a producer will make money only if a show is
323. Janus, the two-faced Roman god, is identified with divergent and opposite impulses,
such as those that create a conflict for the personal manager who attempts concurrently to serve
an artist and that artist's employer. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICT. 626 (10th ed.
1993).
324. See discussion infra Part II.B.
325. See Telephone Interviews with Manya Klempner, Talent Manager, The Firm (Jan. 15,
1999 & Mar. 29, 1999).
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successful. If it is, the artist will certainly benefit as well. Third, an artist
will never be without representation and can retain separate counsel to
defend the artists interests when the manager acts as a producer.
These answers are not entirely satisfying, however, and many of these
issues possess more or less gravity depending on whether the artist in
question is just entering the industry or is an established artist. First, the
argument that a manager's investments actually work to their client's
advantage is certainly compelling, but only when applicable to the
neophyte artist. Shandling most assuredly does not lack for eager and
willing patrons. It would be more beneficial for Shandling to enter into
negotiations for investment with an uncorrupted representative while
keeping patrons at arm's length. Furthermore, equity stakes do not
generate sufficient money to distort incentives to a dangerous degree in the
early years of an entertainment career. The real threat of a conflict is
triggered only where vast sums of money are at stake. For example, where
an established comedian is developing a major television show, the
manager is certainly not doing the client a favor by investing in the
product.
Again, the argument that manager's and artist's interests are largely
aligned, therefore obviating a conflict of interest, is not as true for tyros as
it is for stars. If a manager is bothering to maintain a client roster that
includes untested talent, then it may very well be true the manager is
honestly hitching a ride on the same wagon as the artist and will strive to
pave a clear path for that career. Many of the most sophisticated
production deals, however, involve only established celebrities who are
capable of carrying a television show or film. Brad Grey was certainly not
arranging similar production deals with neophyte actors as he was for the
Cable ACE and Emmy Award-winning Garry Shandling. At that stage of
the management relationship, where so much money may be at stake, a
producer is capable of reaping vast personal wealth by slighting some of
the client's concerns. Grey, for example, would have made far more
money from his equity interest in The Larry Sanders Show if he could have
persuaded Shandling to forgo a tutor on the set, a service that was provided
so Shandling could have his children with him. Of course, Shandling, as an
equity-holder, would also make more money by agreeing to give up the
tutor, but his family ties may be of greater concern to him than his profits.
He now faces the unsavory prospect of negotiating the issue with his
personal manager.
Many of these concerns can be alleviated by requiring the artist to
retain separate counsel for advice when negotiating with a manager-turned-
producer. Indeed, this solution is commonly employed in the context of
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conflicts of interest in the legal profession. Nevertheless, there are still
significant issues with using counsel as a panacea for this problem. First,
unlike members of the bar, personal managers are under no obligation to
advise their clients to retain independent counsel when potential or actual
conflicts of interest arise. Indeed, if the conflict is serious enough, the
manager has a distinct interest in not advising the client to do so.
Second, this solution imposes the burden of correcting the problem
upon the aggrieved party. The artist should not be forced to expend more
money to hire yet another representative when also retaining the services of
the manager to handle these concerns in the first place. Perhaps the artist
could terminate the management agreement and retain the attorney or a
new manager in lieu of the original manager-producer. Again, the artist
incurs the transactional burdens of finding and educating a new
representative. Furthermore, if conflicts with the manager-producer are the
only potential, the client may not fully appreciate their gravity and not
therefore elect to terminate what could be an established and successful
partnership as a prophylactic measure.
This solution has a third wrinkle related to the distinction between
emerging and established artists. While Garry Shandling might easily add
another representative to his payroll and barely feel the financial impact, an
impecunious artist may be in a completely different situation. Many
problems surrounding these conflicts do not appear to strike as deeply into
the lower strata of the entertainment hierarchy. If they do, those clients are
in the most vulnerable position vis-A-vis their managers. If a manager
advances an artist funds to underwrite the beginning of a career, the artist
will be in no position to retain outside legal counsel to protect the artists
interests when they diverge from the manager upon whom the artist relies
so heavily.
2. The Don Pedro326 Conflict: Artist v. Manager qua Titular Producer
In addition to simply leaving an artist without a zealous advocate for
negotiations, the specter of producing creates different problems when the
manager acts not only as an agent of the production entity, but also as a
manager qua titular producer. One difficulty is the possibility the
manager's quest for credit as a producer will corrupt the advice the
manager gives the client regarding what opportunities that artist should
select in building a career.
326. Don Pedro is the character in Shakespeare's Much Ado About Nothing who, dispatched
to represent his lord's romantic overtures to a lover, ends up wooing her for himself.
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A pivotal element of a manager's job is to advise artists on what kinds
of job offers to accept. While agents may generate a number of offers of
employment for the client, choices must ultimately be made. Many of the
choices can have a profound effect on the success or failure of an artist's
career.
When personal managers become, or seek to become, titular
producers, they welcome a host of distortions into their decision making
process with regard to the advice they supply to their clients. Producing
creates a perverse incentive for those managers enamored of producing
credits. Imagine, for example, an artist presented with two different job
offers. The first is a deal in which the artist will receive one million dollars
for services rendered. The manager will collect $250,000 of this fee in an
arrangement with a typical twenty-five percent management commission.
The second is a deal in which the artist will receive $500,000, and the
manager will be awarded the highly coveted credit as a producer while
being compensated in a producer's fee of $125,000. Regardless of the first
offer's financial superiority for the client, any manager who is interested in
capitalizing on the benefits of a producer's credit may be tempted to advise
the artist to accept the second offer.
Granted, in reality these choices are far more complex. The two
offers might be accompanied by very different reputational and
professional benefits. One can easily imagine the benefits of a financially
meager offer that includes the chance to work with a tremendous director,
as contrasted with a lavish engagement that would entail risqu6 and career-
threatening sex scenes. An artist could easily reject money as the
controlling variable, and it is precisely the subjectivity of all the other
factors that necessitates retaining an experienced industry expert like a
personal manager to provide unadulterated advice in those situations.
Assuming the two offers are identical but for the financial variations,
a manager may be tempted to render self-interested advice. If interested in
becoming a producer, the manager may be willing to forgo $125,000 on the
deal in order to receive the credit as a producer of the show. The
producer's credit is not easily quantifiable in a pecuniary sense, but it is
clearly an asset with future returns. The credit serves as an advertisement
for the producer's functions and as a conduit to talent. In the first capacity,
financiers or studios looking to find a producer for their own show will see
the credit as a calling card, indicating whom to approach with an offer. In
the second instance, those same underwriters will learn from the credit
whom to contact as a representative of the actors, writers or director they
may have admired on the show.
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By taking a loss on one particular deal for one particular client, a
manager may reap vast rewards in the advertising value of the producer's
credit. The artist on that deal, however, sees very little benefit of the credit.
Indeed, because many of the benefits will mature only at a later date, the
artist may never see any of them. A manager who would be a producer can
easily sully advice to a client by allowing the allure of credits to influence
the value of a deal to the artist.
Managers point out that the entire industry of personal representation
contains a certain degree of inherent conflicts of interest.327 Talent agents
will always have to grapple with conflicts when they represent more than
one artist of a particular ilk. If a studio approaches an agent with a script in
search of a director, for example, the agent must decide to whom he will
first offer the project. Once the agent presents the script to one client,
whether or not that agent has been tempted to give it to the highest
commission-generating client, the question becomes whether the agent
violated any fiduciary obligations of zealous representation to other
directors on the agent's roster. If the agent was an attorney at a law firm,
the answer would almost certainly be yes.
The fact that these conflicts exist in one sector of the entertainment
industry does not excuse their proliferation elsewhere. Perhaps agents are
not subject to enough scrutiny and the solution is to subject both agents and
managers to a code of professional ethics similar to those of every state bar.
As far as identifying the problem, however, suffice it to say adding more
conflicts to the scenario is hardly the ideal answer.
The choice of job offers raises another fallacy in the typical personal
manager's sales kit. Managers are fond of decorating their producing roles
by arguing that it is in the artist's interest to have the managers also serve
as producers. Moreover, it costs the client nothing. The first part of this
sales pitch stems from the argument that an artist would be far better off
having the producer of a film or television series be someone who also has
an interest in the artist's career, rather than a completely disinterested party.
The manager-producer will be a familiar conduit through whom the artist
can complain about the production. Although it suffers from the same
weakness, this argument replicates a prior argument that managers and
artists have aligning interests, even when the managers produce. The
second leg of the sales pitch, however, has not been previously discussed.
Managers claim serving as producers allows them to collect
producer's fees from the studio or financier in lieu of a commission from
327. See Telephone Interviews with Manya Klempner, Talent Manager, The Firm (Jan. 15,
1999 & Mar. 29, 1999).
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the artist. If a production company, for example, offers a one million dollar
contract to an artist to act in a television show and also offers to pay the
manager $250,000 to serve as an executive producer on the show, the artist
will not be obligated to pay the manager anything on the deal. From an
accounting perspective, that is certainly true. When the manager is acting
as a producer in only a titular capacity, however, the production company
is simply offering the producer's fee because that is the only way to acquire
the artist. Many of these titular producers in fact add no value to the
production as producers. In these instances the production company has
budgeted a certain sum of money needed to acquire the artist's services,
and has itself simply divided the amounts between the manager and artist.
From the production company's perspective, there is no difference between
this kind of deal and one that simply gives the artist $1,250,000 without
retaining the manager as a producer. Studios and financiers of films and
television shows are indifferent to the way in which their money is
apportioned amongst stars and their representatives.
The only situations in which this may not be true are ones in which
the managers do, in fact, add value to the production process by serving as
true studio representatives. In those instances, the financiers may actually
be compensating the manager for services as a producer, drawing from the
sums allocated for producers' salaries. If the manager is capable of
performing the tasks of a producer, the financier need not hire another
person to perform those activities, and can therefore deliver the sum it has
allocated for the artist entirely to the artist. From a financial perspective,
these situations are clearly an ideal scenario for the production entities,
managers and the artists. In a great deal of cases, however, the manager is
a producer in name only-usually "executive producer"-and the financier
still must retain the services of another person actually to produce the
show.
Although managers can occasionally leverage their relationships with
artists to become producers and effectively provide their clients
management services for free on those deals, there is one problem: the
more effective a manager is at producing, the greater the risk of conflicts of
interest. If a manager is, in fact, acting as an agent of the production
company by running the show as a producer, the manager is more likely to
have interests that diverge from the artist's. Shandling's tutor situation is
one such example. When managers act as producers in purely a cosmetic
capacity, their interests are still largely vested in their clients, not in the
production company for whom they work ostensibly. Thus, while those
managers who do produce may offer their stars a great financial break by
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eliminating the client's need to pay a commission, the decisions to do so
estrange them from the artist's interests.
a. Double-dipping
A truly egregious problem occasionally occurs when a manager
agrees to accept a producer's fee on a client's show. Almost all
management agreements stipulate a manager will not take a commission
from an artist when that manager is producing the artist's work. The idea is
the manager is compensated from a third-party by at least the amount of the
commission the manager would receive from the client. Some managers,
however, have been accused of accepting both a producer's fee and the
client's commission. This practice is known as "double-dipping" and is a
blatant violation of the management agreement and the manager's fiduciary
obligations to the artist. Shandling accused his manager Brad Grey of such
an impropriety.328
b. Siphoning Talent
Shandling also accused Grey of siphoning talent.329  When
management firms develop sophisticated and variegated production arms,
the partners of the firm are allowed to become executive producers on a
large number of shows. Of course, the wider the net a producer casts, the
greater the possible financial returns from producer's fees and returns on
equity investments. Other non-monetary advantages of producing are
similarly telescoped when managers expand their fiefdoms to include
several television series or films. Unique problems may occur, however,
when a manager produces several shows for various clients. The manager
may direct artists away from some shows towards others and this
redeployment can easily affect the fortunes of the different shows.
Shandling contented that Grey had hired a number of talented writers
to work on The Larry Sanders Show and signed those writers to
management agreements. 330 After doing so, Grey directed those writers to
other shows he was producing in order to bolster the shows' success.33'
Naturally, the writers may have benefited from more lucrative contracts
and Grey could have profited from multiple successful shows. This
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situation harmed Shandling, however, who alleged that Grey, through his
activities, had breached his fiduciary duty.
332
Although the Shandling lawsuit did not expose the alleged conflicts of
interest to the glare of a trial, it generated a great deal of interest and served
as a coming-out party for the less savory side of the artist-manager
relationships. If managers continue to conduct business as usual, and
agents continue to be successful in their bid to avoid regulations, more
lawsuits will certainly be coming attractions.
IV. A TAXONOMY OF POTENTIAL REMEDIES
We have to be wary of solutions in search of a problem.
333
The range of problems created when managers act as producers and
the diversity of casualties in this melee are far too complicated to be solved
by any single panacea. The industry can, nevertheless, address various
sorts of issues with different tools. This situation, like many disorderly
legal scenarios, can be altered by the power of the state, the ability of the
parties to contract privately, the influence of unions or any combination of
these devices. Each of these mechanisms have a different role to play in
the future governance of personal managers.
A. Public Law
Public law currently wields a heavy hand in regulating the daily
affairs of talent agents, but no regulation delineates the duties of personal
managers.334 The current drama afflicting the industry, however, is certain
to bring this state of affairs to an abrupt halt. One legislator has already
proposed to expand the scope of the TAA to regulate activities in which
managers engage.335 Yet, personal managers do not have much to fear
from public law because the scope of the proposal is mild and unlikely to
threaten their Edenic existence. Moreover, if this bill or a future one
attempts to strike at the heart of managers' regulatory largesse, the
controlling interests in Sacramento would almost certainly choke it in its
332. See id.
333. See Telephone Interview with Sheila Kuehl, California Assembly Speaker Pro Tern
(Apr. 15, 1999).
334. Gary A. Greenberg, The Plight of the Personal Manager in California: A Legislative
Solution, in COUNSELING CLIENTS IN THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY 1993, at 485 (PLI Pat.
Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. G-359, 1993).
335. See Nick Madigan, Proposed Law Would Regulate Managers, DAILY VARIETY, Jan.
28, 1999, at 5.
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crib. Even if state regulations against managers could survive a
treacherous gestation in the California Assembly, their tools are too dull
and rigid to cut the knot of conflicts that are afflicting the industry.
1. The Kuehl Proposal
Almost inadvertently, Assemblywoman Sheila Kuehl initiated the
most vocal debate to date concerning the fate of managers. In a
coincidental turn of events, Kuehl proposed a bill to regulate managers just
as the war between AMG and CAA was reaching its zenith.336
Sacramento's interference was a zephyr of pure oxygen to Hollywood's
incendiary manager bonfire. Managers have, for the first time, scurried to
form a trade association to represent them in the state capital and
successfully defended their interests.337
Santa Monica Democrat Sheila Kuehl is the California Assembly's
Speaker Pro Tem and a former child actress.338 When she performed under
the name of Sheila James, Kuehl learned first hand of the potential abuse
managers could perpetrate on child actors and their parents. The problems
Kuehl witnessed then and still fears, however, are of a wholly different
species than the taxonomy explored in this Article.
339
a. Precipitating Factors
Each year, the Los Angeles District Attorney and City Attorney
prosecute a large number of scam artists who pose as artists' managers in
order to defraud the parents of young children.340  The typical modus
operandi of these individuals is to establish a business that claims to be
either a talent agency or a management firm. 341 They then obtain lists of
the names of young children in the Los Angeles area and write to the
336. See Kirk Honeycutt, Managers Licensing Bill Just Introduced, BACK STAGE, Mar. 5,
1999, at 3.
337. See Galloway & Busch, supra note 36, at 1; Petrikin, supra note 36, at 5.
338. See Sheila Kuehl, Commonly Asked Questions & Answers Regarding AB 884, Press
Release, Feb. 22, 1999.
339. See Nick Madigan, Bill Guards Wanna-Be Child Stars, DAILY VARIETY, August 31,
1999, at 5.
340. See Telephone Interview with Sheila Kuehl, California Assembly Speaker Pro Tem
(Apr. 15, 1999); Telephone Interview with Mark Lambert, Los Angeles Deputy City Attorney
(Jan. 26, 1999).
341. See Telephone Interview with Sheila Kuehl, California Assembly Speaker Pro Tern
(Apr. 15, 1999); Telephone Interview with Mark Lambert, Los Angeles Deputy City Attorney
(Jan. 26, 1999).
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parents of those children inviting them to bring their child to an audition.
342
The letter usually states the child has been identified through school
yearbooks as possessing the right look for a role and the audition could be
the gateway to a successful acting career.343 When the parents bring their
child to the audition, the managers identify the child as a great potential
talent and promise to find lucrative employment for the budding actor. All
the parents need do is provide an initial investment, usually of several
hundreds of dollars, to underwrite the creation of a photographic portfolio
necessary to landing jobs. The photographs are wildly overpriced, and the
agency never finds work for these children.3" When parents are able to
persuade the police or district attorney to investigate the operation, the fly-
by-night business simply dissolves instantly, only to re-open under another
name and a different set of offices.345
Kuehl proposed several revisions to the licensing provisions
governing talent agencies that would establish statutory standards to
regulate personal managers. 346 Her proposal, Assembly Bill 884 ("A.B.
884"), would have required that managers be licensed.347 A.B. 884 was
altered, however, and enacted in a substantially different form.348  As
enacted, the Bill requires all persons who charge a fee before the artist
obtains artistic employment post a bond with the state, insert statutorily
provided provisions to cancel a contract and guarantee the right to
refund.349 While the enacted Bill may affect managers it is narrowly
drafted to reach fly-by-night "management" operations. Kuehl, a
Harvard-trained attorney, worked with the Los Angeles County District
Attorney and the Los Angeles City Attorney-each of whom handled a
number of cases involving fraudulent representations made to potential
342. See Telephone Interview with Sheila Kuehl, California Assembly Speaker Pro Tern
(Apr. 15, 1999); Telephone Interview with Mark Lambert, Los Angeles Deputy City Attorney
(Jan. 26, 1999).
343. See Telephone Interview with Sheila Kuehl, California Assembly Speaker Pro Tem
(Apr. 15, 1999); Telephone Interview with Mark Lambert, Los Angeles Deputy City Attorney
(Jan. 26, 1999).
344. See Telephone Interview with Mark Lambert, Los Angeles Deputy City Attorney (Jan.
26, 1999).
345. See id.
346. See A.B. 884, 1999-2000 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999) (as amended on Apr. 26, 1999).
347. See id.
348. Act of Oct. 5, 1999, ch. 626, §§ 1-2, 1999 Cal. Adv. Legis. Serv. 626 (Deering's) (to
be codified at CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 1701-1701.20).
349. See id.
350. See id.
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child actors by these operators-to draft the original bill.351 Kuehl stated
that her initial goal in creating a licensing process for managers was to
ensure actors attempting to enter the business know whether they are
dealing with a reputable manager who is licensed by the state.35 2
The problems Kuehl sought to remedy are of a different nature from
the conflicts created by law-abiding personal managers who produce, but
her proposal nevertheless threatened to affect that area significantly.
Currently, personal managers operate almost entirely unregulated, except to
the extent the TAA imposes a negative duty on them not to procure
employment. 353 Once aware of the Kuehl bill, representatives from all of
Hollywood's leading management firms met to form a coalition much like
the Association of Talent Agents. 354  The representatives hired two
prominent attorneys, Bertram Fields and Ron Olson, to represent their
interests.355
Kuehl professed a certain degree of bewilderment over the managers'
reaction to her bill because she claimed her proposals did not "alter the
working relationships that exist among agents, managers, and their
clients. 356 Despite Kuehl's protestations, the managers expressed at least
two concerns with the bill.357 First, they feared the new law would impose
criminal sanctions, including possible jail time, on those who violated it.
Kuehl's response to this concern was the bill's sole criminal penalty
established a misdemeanor only when outright fraud is perpetrated.358 This
punishment was, in her words, aimed specifically at fly-by-night operators.
The second concern held by managers was that the bill would have stripped
them of their highly coveted right to produce. To this, Kuehl stated
unequivocally that no such prohibition existed in the bill.359
In addition, Kuehl described her proposal as "an opening bid in
bridge," one that could, and did, change as managers reacted to her ideas.
Although the bill changed, this did not fully assuage managers' concerns
351. See Telephone Interviews with Bethany Aseltine, Legislative Assistant to
Assemblywoman Kuehl (Jan. 26, 1999 & Apr. 13, 1999).
352. See Telephone Interviews with Bethany Aseltine, Legislative Assistant to
Assemblywoman Kuehl (Jan. 26, 1999 & Apr. 13, 1999).
353. See discussion supra Part II.E.
354. Galloway & Busch, supra note 36, at 1.
355. See id.
356. See Telephone Interview with Sheila Kuehl, California Assembly Speaker Pro Tem
(Apr. 15, 1999).
357. See generally Galloway & Busch, supra note 36.
358. James Bates & Claudia Eller, Ovitz, Kuehl Rocking Boat for Agents, Managers, L.A.
TIMEs, Feb. 23, 1999, at Cl.
359. See id.
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because it could have still evolved into something far more draconian.
While agents might like to see managers more regulated in order to level
the business playing field, few of them expressed delight with the
legislature's review of the TAA. Just as the bill had expanded to strip
managers of a greater number of their current freedoms, it could have also
metastasized to outlaw the lucrative packaging fees agents now enjoy.
Both managers and agents were uneasy about Kuehl's bill simply because
it threatened to "have the government breathing down their necks. '3 6°
b. Consequences to the Management Industry
In its early incarnation, the Kuehl bill would not have had any effect
on the way in which managers conduct their business. The proposal made
no attempt to proscribe producing and would have had little effect on the
industry beyond imposing a few bureaucratic hassles.36' In establishing
requirements to be licensed, to post bond and to use written agreements,
Kuehl's original proposal tracked the correlated language for agents in the
TAA.
Kuehl's bill did not address the problems of manager-producer
conflicts of interest. Despite that deficiency, managers still protested it
because it simply codified ineffectual hoop-jumping without addressing
any serious issues. The bill was ostensibly motivated by a desire to stop
fraudulent management firms from bilking citizens out of their money.
Presumably, however, these scam artists could simply forge the documents
that certify state licensure, as they have already cloaked themselves in all
the other trappings of a legitimate business. Indeed, only the law-abiding
firms, those firms with production arms taking advantage of high-profile
clients would comply with this law, resulting in the legislative pellet's
missing its mark, striking but bouncing feebly off heavily armored culprits.
As long as Kuehl had no intention of addressing the management-producer
issue and no likelihood of affecting the behavior of her targets, her proposal
appeared to be mere legislative fluff.
Kuehl defended the bill for its treatment of criminal managers.362
Rather than simply relying on a melange of general criminal provisions in
the California Code, law enforcement officials would have been able to
invoke a statute specifically crafted to punish fraudulent operations.
360. See id.
361. See generally James Bates, Managers Bill to Get Tighter Focus, L.A. TiMES, Apr. 1,
1999, at C5.
362. See Sheila Kuehl, Talent Agencies and Artist's Managers, Legislative Counsel's
Memorandum, Feb. 22, 1999.
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2. Expanding the Kuehl Proposal to Ban Producing by Managers
While Kuehl's bill might not have been an answer to conflicts of
interest created by managers who produce, variations upon it might well be.
Kuehl's bill could have been widely expanded to impose a host of
regulations upon managers, many of which would surely eliminate
potential conflicts of interest with their clients. Using the indiscriminate
armaments of public law for this task, however, creates an unacceptably
high degree of collateral damage to this segment of the entertainment
industry.
a. Considerations for Legislators
An advantage of state legislation in this area is its power to occupy
the field completely. Unlike private contract or guild regulations, which
must operate within the confines of state law and are necessarily limited by
it, the California Assembly itself can operate with impunity to regulate
managers. With this power comes the responsibility of crafting laws that
accurately address the problems. If legislators err, they cannot use private
actors to correct their mistakes, given the rigidity of the legislative process.
The lawmakers should, therefore, be very clear about what problems they
seek to correct and whether they are the proper mechanics for the job.
Confusion about the precise problem can cloud solutions. Legislators
need to be wary of red herrings in their deliberative process. One such ruse
may come from talent agents who are eager to see managers more strictly
regulated. The motivation of these agents is not to solve problems caused
by conflicts of interest but to level the playing field in the marketplace of
artists' representation. Why legislators should care the agents currently
face a competitive disadvantage is unclear. This disadvantage is largely
due to private, not public, law because the ability to produce was
voluntarily forfeited by agents in their negotiations with the entertainment
guilds.
Agents will claim that the state is nevertheless responsible for under-
enforcement of the TAA. Managers, they complain, are rampantly
violating the TAA by operating as unlicensed agents. The under-
enforcement of the TAA does not justify passing separate legislation to
govern managers. Rather, agents need to make their complaints known to
the executive, not the legislature. The Department of Labor monitors
enforcement of the TAA. Whether or not the TAA is sufficiently enforced
is an open question. While stories of managers procuring employment for
their clients abound, the Act has a powerful self-enforcement mechanism
that permits aggrieved parties to recoup all fees paid to errant
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representatives. A lack of lawsuits under the TAA may indicate the
absence of an aggrieved citizenry as much as the dilatory methods of the
Department of Labor.
While the agents' protestations of simple unfairness may not rise to
the level necessary to warrant passing new legislation, the inherent
problems in the manager-producer role present a stronger case. In this
context, the experience of agents seems more relevant. Because agents are
prohibited from producing, they suffer from none of the vertical conflicts
afflicting managers and their clients. Although they must still grapple with
horizontal conflicts among their several clients, the industry has many
imperfections not at issue here. A straightforward way to eliminate any
possible conflicts with managers would be to expand Kuehl's legislation or
to pass a separate amendment to the TAA imposing a blanket ban on
producing by personal managers.
The legislature could effect this change by simply replicating the
language found in the collective bargaining agreements between the
entertainment guilds and agents. Kuehl devised a definition for personal
managers in her legislation. That definition could easily be joined with the
relevant language prohibiting agents from producing. While the TAA does
not by its terms govern personal managers, it does seem to be the logical
statutory home for any such proposal, and its name could be revised to
what it was from 1959 to 1967, the Artists' Managers Act. 363 Before
pursuing this solution to the conflicts problem, lawmakers must consider
the detrimental side effects of their intervention.
b. Consequences for Managers
Enacting a proscription upon managers equivalent to the one that
prevents agents from producing would essentially provide a prophylactic
barrier to all conflicts of interest created from the practice of managers
owning any part of their clients' work. The rule would make impossible
any situation where a personal manager divided loyalty between client
interests and the manager's personal stake in the production. Managers
would have the capacity only to advocate for their clients, not to receive a
producer's fee or credit. In many ways, therefore, state legislation is an
easy and comprehensive remedy to the problems currently afflicting the
* personal representative industry. Under such a law, Brad Grey could not
have acted with the appearance of impropriety with regard to Shandling.
The Shandling case, however, also illustrates some of the
shortcomings of such a proposal. When Shandling first created a television
363. See discussion supra Part II.C.2.
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show, he was eager to see his manager invest in the project. Artists in their
early years typically need financial and creative investors to bolster their
shows when those artists are most vulnerable. Managers often provide
their clients with funds to find their legs at the beginning of their careers,
and any broad prohibition on ownership would eliminate a vital source of
seed money to many aspiring artists. This rule, therefore, would have a
disproportionate impact on those artists who are already in the most
precarious positions. The conflicts of interest so dangerous in the
Shandling situation existed only when both Shandling and Grey had gained
enormous stature in the entertainment industry. At the beginning of an
artist's career, having a manager invest usually aligns both parties interests
more than it divides them.
Perhaps a financial cap could be imposed to restrict the extent of
managers' ownership interest so that no manager could invest more than a
certain dollar amount in any one client's career. This exemption would
allow for the desirable germination of aspiring artists, while maintaining
the focus of the legislation on the greatest source of conflicts: managers
producing highly valued television shows and films. Politicians may find it
very difficult to strike a balance between allowing a manager to provide
enough support for a fledging venture without cleaving the manager's
interests in the artist. The difficulty of such a task and the potential
miscalculations may be better addressed by allowing those familiar with
the industry, such as guild representatives, to calibrate the setting.
If legislators do choose to outlaw producing by managers, they need
to remember the demographics of their constituencies. The universe of
artists varies enormously, from the multi-millionaire superstars to the
struggling and unemployed. This diversity makes it difficult to promulgate
rules that benefit the entire pool. For the most vulnerable groups, blunt
legislative remedies have the potential to inflict more harm than good.
Indeed, perhaps the greatest limitation of any legislative remedy to
the conflicts of interest problem is that it is such a blunt tool. Because
legislation acts with such a broad sweep, it must be painstakingly crafted to
function precisely; yet, that precision is often simply impossible to achieve
with public law. Legislative solutions to the conflicts of interest problems
have the potential to misfire as did the Kuehl proposal. While Kuehl's Bill
was aimed at fraudulent managers, its effects might have been felt most
acutely by the law-abiding. Furthermore, while outlawing producing may
target the largest management firms, its effects may be felt most by smaller
management operations representing only struggling artists. Private law,
with its greater flexibility, may provide a more precise instrument for
remedying this problem. Indeed, the prohibitions preventing agents from
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producing are created by guild regulations, not any law passed by the
California Legislature.
Depending on one's view of the legislative process, state legislation
may have one additional benefit. Because the issue of managers producing
is so closely bound up with the current dispute between managers and
agents, the entertainment industry's most powerful entities have some
interest in the resolving this issue. The high profile of the dispute can
easily warp open discussion. Even Hollywood's most powerful are
reluctant to defy their important competitors. The industry is so fluid, with
so many repeat players, few of its members are interested in drawing the ire
of their colleagues by speaking against them. Legislators may very well be
immune to these struggles; indeed, Kuehl herself has pointed to the
intractability of the conflict between managers and agents, acknowledging
"[o]ften, we are asked to make these hard decisions. 3 64 Of course, if one
believes the legislative process is not immune to the influence of special
interest groups, then Kuehl's confidence in the legislative detachment is
overstated.
A final argument in favor of public law is the strength of its symbolic
effect.365 The common law currently provides remedies for breaches of
fiduciary duties when managers take advantage of conflicts of interest and
additional codified remedies could certainly add to a plaintiff's arsenal.
When a legislature passes specific laws, courts often take judicial notice of
the lawmakers' message and may accordingly grant relief on the basis of a
precise legal justification rather than on general principles. Many
regulations merely codify legal principles already established at common
law, but to which legislators believe particular attention should be paid.
Whether this totem is worth forging in the face of drawbacks with state
laws is a separate issue.
c. The Plausibility of State Regulation
An issue distinct from the merits of a public law solution is the
likelihood of achieving such a solution. The California Assembly likely
did not pass Kuehl's initial bill because it would have had such a large an
impact on the finances of a major entertainment constituency.
Furthermore, because conflicts of interest are often a latent problem, the
potential victims are largely unaware of them. Celebrities can be among
364. David Robb, Legislator Says Her Bill Will Focus on Fraud, Not Business,
HOLLYWOOD REP., Mar. 15, 1999, at 1 (citation omitted).
365. See Telephone Interview with Sheila Kuehl, California Assembly Speaker Pro Tem
(Apr. 15, 1999).
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the most powerful lobbyists in California, but despite their interest in this
issue they may not weigh in on it very much at all. While artists are not
delighted to have a bevy of representatives to maintain, they have only
recently become aware of what can go wrong when managers produce.
With more instances of lawsuits such as Shandling's, and more managers
producing all the time, the issue will only gain prominence.
Managers have a history of successful lobbying efforts in Sacramento.
Their joint forces would doom any pending legislation.366 Gearing up for
the battle over Kuehl's original bill, managers formed a coalition to protect
their interests under the leadership of Hollywood's top lawyers, Ron Olson
and Bertram Fields. Furthermore, agents have long relied on the ATA to
speak for their interests.367 While the two groups are at odds on this
issue--many agents would be pleased to see managers' operations so
cabined--the government is a common enemy.368 Both of these groups
have achieved success in the past by enlisting the help of persuasive
celebrities on this issue and they could certainly muster a few satisfied
customers to lean on lawmakers. Indeed, the rapid demise of the Kuehl bill
as proposed was a testament to that clout.
Furthermore, if the Assembly prohibits producing by managers, it will
insert itself further into the operations of the industry than ever before. The
TAA does not restrict agents to this degree; this is the job of the guilds.
369
Additionally, managers and agents would not be left to fight this
governmental expansion alone. In all likelihood, they would find an ally in
the governor. Governor Gray Davis has close political connections to
powerful managers and agents and would certainly be uncomfortable with
open warfare between the two in the legislature.370
Any discussion of crafting a public law to regulate managers in the
same fashion as agents, vis-A-vis the ability to produce, is preempted by the
sheer implausibility of the California Assembly ever doing so. Such a law
would constitute the legislature's greatest interference to date in one of the
state's cash cow industries and would be vigorously contested by two
powerful constituencies. But many good laws have survived the legislative
gauntlet of detractors on all sides. Such a proposal, however, would
probably not be a good law.
Even if such a bill could be crafted to target its effects on only the
gravest offenders-major management firms with production arms-the
366. See Galloway & Busch, supra note 36, at 1; Petrikin, supra note 36, at 5.
367. See Galloway & Busch, supra note 36, at 1; Petrikin, supra note 36, at 5.
368. See Rival Reps Ready, supra note 1, at 1.
369. See discussion supra Part ll.D.
370. See generally Rival Reps Ready, supra note 1.
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heavy hand of public law is ill-suited to deal with an industry in which
individual clients vary widely in their feelings on this issue. As a result of
their ignorance or unique circumstances, many artists would rather have
managers who could stay involved as producers in these productions. For
those individuals, a state law outlawing the practice is too blunt an
instrument. If more flexible and precise private mechanisms could be
afforded by the same protections, then public law is not the solution.
B. Private Law
At the opposite end of the remedial spectrum from state law is private
law. The debate over whether more governmental intervention is
preferable to a laissez-faire economy and legal regime is a tired one, but
certain elements of it are pertinent to this discussion. Personal managers
are understandably strong proponents of minimal governmental
intervention in their domain, as those reaping profits almost always are.
Abdicating a state-sponsored solution to the conflicts problems does not,
however, necessarily translate into allowing the problems to proliferate
unchecked. Indeed, in the case of these conflicts of interest, the ideal
situation is a blend of two ingredients of private law: one a familiar staple,
the other peculiar to the entertainment industry.
1. Contract
An open market in which intelligent, well-informed and financially
independent parties bargain freely for their interests is often an excellent
way to achieve a mutually agreeable regime. The entertainment business
features many of those necessary ingredients. Freedom of contract is a
healthy component in any blueprint for private sovereignty, both
financially and legally.
a. Arguments & Analysis
The parties involved in the most serious conflict of interest scenarios,
established artists and sophisticated managers, are almost certainly rich.
The sums at issue in these financial arrangements often run into the
millions of dollars for each side. 37' These parties have an interest in
protecting their considerable assets and the means to do so. These are not
members of a disenfranchised lower class in need of state protection.
Indeed, few sectors of the American economy feature such wealthy players
on both sides of the transactions. In spite of the ostentatious wealth of
371. See Telephone Interview with Dan Cox, Reporter, Variety (Jan. 26, 1999).
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many managers and their clients, legislators should avoid caricaturing the
entire industry so glibly. Many participants in the conflict of interest
problems are wealthy, but for every superstar celebrity there are hundreds
of aspiring actors that remain unemployed for years. These actors still need
representation.
The legislature cannot abandon the issue simply because of flashy
stereotypes. Many artists do not fit the requirements of the ideal open
market and need maximum protection from the government. In the case of
conflicts of interest created by managers who produce their clients' films
and television shows, however, low-profile artists typically do not need
governmental guardianship. The conflicts almost always exist when the
client's product is capable of generating funds sufficient to distort the
manager's interests. Thus, while the market may not be homogeneously
wealthy, those sectors imperiled by the conflicts problem almost always
are.
Relying on contract rather than public law allows both sides to adjust
the terms of their agreements to their specific needs. For many artists,
having the producer of their enterprise be someone whom they trust, and
who has represented them for years, is far preferable to an unknown agent
of the production entity.372 Savvy artists retain separate legal counsel to
advise them in negotiations with their manager-turned-producer, rather than
either forgoing protection or terminating their management agreements.
For those individuals, a state prohibition against producing would
paternalistically deprive them of what they consider their best career
choices. In a wealthy market, there may be many artists who wish to
pursue this option with the financial means to do so.
The advantages of an open regulatory scheme are achievable only
when the artists are aware of the risks of potential conflicts. Even the very
wealthy may not know to seek information. One purpose of artist
representation is to relieve the client of the need to handle mundane issues.
If the artist is unaware of potential problems, and the manager fails to
inform him, then an unscrupulous manager can manipulate contracts to that
manager's own advantage where the government has vacated the field.
Although Garry Shandling is both wealthy and intelligent, he arguably did
not protect himself through contract. Since the emergence of the Shandling
case, the prominence of this issue has increased dramatically. Therefore,
many artists today have information Shandling lacked.
372. See Telephone Interviews with Manya Klempner, Talent Manager, The Firm (Jan. 15,
1999 & Mar. 29, 1999).
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An argument in favor of contract over state law is that enacting
regulation, where it is not needed, serves only to undermine legislation and
dilute regulatory capital in areas where it is needed most. Broadening the
TAA to include superfluous provisions detracts from legislation in more
important areas, such as where victims are not wealthy celebrities. Of
course, that argument appears to suffer when even Garry Shandling has run
into trouble without state protection.
Attorneys for Shandling, however, did not lament the absence of
statutes under which to bring their suit against Grey.373 Indeed, they chose
not to bring suit under the existing legislation even though3 74 the TAA
could have added leverage to their settlement negotiations. Shandling's
attorneys may not have challenged Grey under the TAA because they did
not believe they had a colorable claim.
Before even reaching that question, however, one must acknowledge
the TAA is an unsatisfying source of relief for Shandling. Suing under the
Act and any legislation under the Labor Code would necessarily mean
submitting to an administrative hearing under the Labor Commissioner's
jurisdiction where damages would be limited to commissions paid.
Shandling's attorneys were more interested in suing under common law
causes of action,375 which not only covered the gamut of their allegations
against Grey, but also provided for far greater damages upon recovery.
While a well-conceived regulatory scheme might address these concerns, it
need not when sufficient alternatives already exist.
b. Limitations of Laissez-faire
While the arguments in favor of private law are persuasive, such a
laissez-faire regime is not without its limitations. Private law works best-
and perhaps only-when both sides to a negotiation share a large degree of
information. Even with wealthy players, that may not be the case.
Regardless of whether an artist has the resources needed to retain
independent counsel for negotiations with a manager-producer, those
resources are all for naught without proper knowledge. Despite defects,
public law can remedy problems private law cannot by legislating the
transmission of information. Kuehl's proposal, for example, provided for
particular recitations of artists' rights to be affixed to all personal
373. See Telephone Interview with William Isaacson, Attorney for Garry Shandling (Jan.
27, 1999).
374. See discussion supra Part II.B.
375. See discussion supra Part III.B.
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management agreements.376 Without such a mandatory rule, managers are
free to leave the client to discover those rights for themselves. To cure this
flaw of a wholly laissez-faire regime, a private law solution must attempt to
replicate the informational disparity by borrowing ideas from the positive
elements of public law. Attorneys and unions are great sources of
information for artists who have them, but in a private law regime one pays
for the system's benefits with a measure of insecurity. To patch these
holes, the contract must be spackled with the benefits provided by the
entertainment unions.
c. Assessing Contract
A heavy-handed legislative involvement in this issue threatens to
eliminate the ability of artists to protect themselves. Artists want a flexible
business setting through the ability to freely contract. Of course, a state
regulation has some benefits, but many of those advantages are achievable
without deleterious side effects from a well-functioning market that
capitalizes on the strengths of unions. The types of artists most likely to be
afflicted by conflicts of interests with their managers are the wealthy and
economically resilient, capable of drafting contracts to their own
advantage. A completely laissez-faire legal regime, on the other hand, does
not fully address the problems of managers using their greater information
to take advantage of their clients. For these reasons, public law is a
weapon too volatile to be used in these close quarters and the ability to
freely contract alone cannot be the sole arrow in an artist's quiver.
2. Guild Regulations
The entertainment guilds provide vital missing ingredients to a recipe
of artist protection by featuring free contract and common law remedies.
The guilds possess two unique capabilities essential for filling the gaps
between a clumsy public law regime and a minimalist free market:
information and enforcement. 377  In the current debate simmering in
Hollywood, the guilds have remained conspicuously silent.378 There is an
increasing need for the guilds to make a much more overt contribution to
the dialogue in order to protect their members from the increasing number
of managers producing television shows and films.
376. See discussion supra Part IV.A.1.
377. See generally Chi, supra note 116.
378. See Telephone Interview with Nick Madigan, Reporter, Variety (Feb. 3, 1999).
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a. Information
Guilds are particularly well-situated to monitor the industry and to
take account of trends within it. They are certainly aware of the conflicts
of interest that arise when managers act as producers. This information
alone is a valuable commodity to the members of the guilds, as long as
those members receive information from some source. In the legal
profession, one of the primary ways that conflicts of interest are addressed
is by providing clients with information. When an attorney has a conflict
of interest with a client, the attorney can address it by advising the client to
seek independent counsel, or to sign a waiver of the conflict, after being
educated about the possible conflicts.
While personal managers are not bound by a code of professional
responsibility equivalent to that governing attorneys, artists can receive
similar warnings and advice through their guilds. Indeed, a paradigm in
which the clients are all linked by a common bond may work far more
effectively than one in which the service providers are similarly linked.
After all, clients have a greater interest in accumulating the information
than attorneys and managers have in disseminating it.
Information alone is rarely a sufficient inoculation from systemic
infections; however, the combination of information with artists' other
resources provides the best solution in this case. Many of the artists most
vulnerable to their managers conflicts are wealthy. They are very well
situated to use the information to protect themselves. Learning that
independent counsel is a vital line of defense in negotiations and possessing
an awareness of double-dipping will enable a client to make an informed
decision of whether to proceed with a manager-producer.
b. Enforcement
In addition to simply providing intelligence to their members, guilds
can take more interventionist steps to address the conflicts of interests with
managers.379 The most obvious step is to regulate managers in precisely
the same fashion as agents. This would entail establishing a franchising
mechanism for managers and promulgating regulations requiring guild
members to retain the services of only franchised managers. Guilds could
easily condition franchises on managers not producing or owning any of
their client's products. Essentially, this regime would include managers in
the agreement struck between SAG and the ATA in 1952.38o
379. See discussion supra Part I.D.
380. See supra Part II.C.2.
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Why have guilds not already done so? The guilds justify their
inaction on the grounds that both managers and unions perceive a
fundamental difference between managers and agents. Therefore, they
conclude managers should be treated differently.38' Yet while the
differences between agents and managers are manifest, managers today
increasingly resemble the agents of post-World War II Hollywood: not
only representing talent but also controlling production. That very duet,
and all its attendant complications, was what prompted a serious renovation
in the architecture of personal representation.
The time is ripe for guilds to effect a similar intervention. Many
commentators and participants have wondered aloud why they have not
done so already. Richard Masur, head of SAG, has asserted that "managers
should be able to produce as long as they are not acting as agents." 382 Of
course, managers today are acting as agents did in the 1940's. Indeed,
some would allege they are also acting as agents do today.
The guilds do not, however, need to enact the same blanket
prohibition against managers as the one that currently prevents agents from
acquiring ownership interests in their clients' products. Because managers
become involved in their clients' careers at a very early stage, there is a
greater need to be flexible in allowing managers to invest more heavily in
an artist's career. A guild regulation should not treat all artists the same for
the same reasons a state law should not.383 Less established artists can
benefit greatly from involving managers in their careers at an early stage.
This benefit can be preserved, again, by providing for a cap on the amount
a manager can invest in his client. The guilds are in the best position to
determine what that cap should be, but they would need to ensure that such
a restriction carefully navigates between being too low to benefit many
struggling artists and too high to protect artists at risk from conflicted
manager-producers.
Another way to protect artists would be for guilds to establish a
rebuttable presumption against managers producing. To produce a client's
project, a manager would have to petition the guild for permission. The
381. See Telephone Interview with Richard Masur, Executive Director, Screen Actors Guild
(Feb. 23, 1999).
382. See Telephone Interview with Richard Masur, Executive Director, Screen Actors Guild
(Feb. 29, 1999).
383. The negotiations between the National Basketball Association Players Association and
the league's owners during this season's lock-out suffered from problems endemic to guilds with
a diverse membership. In the National Basketball Association, the "franchise" players are a
wholly different species than the more prevalent "journeymen" athletes, and the divergence of
their interests necessitated particular attention during these negotiations. See generally Mark
Asher, Stern Asks Players to Vote on Offer, WASH. POST, Dec. 29, 1998, at D4.
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process could be designed to provide the artist with a good deal of
protection against making an ill-informed decision. If, after consultation
with the guild, a client wishes to allow the manager to produce, the
injunction against doing so could be lifted. This case-by-case method
might impose a financial burden on the guilds to operate a screening
process, but with so much to be gained from the privilege, managers would
almost certainly be willing to pay a processing fee. The primary advantage
to having the guilds, rather than the government, perform this function is
their greater knowledge of the industry and the flexibility they bring to
problems needing specially tailored solutions.
c. Evaluating Guild Regulations
There are a variety of ways in which the guilds could protect their
members from manager-producer conflicts. The guild's continuing
inaction and silence on this issue is baffling.38  Of course, every
concession the guilds demand from other parties could mean forfeiting
rights of their own.385  Additionally, regulating managers will require
substantial effort because the managers will resist, and no one wants to
make an enemy of Michael Ovitz.
Nevertheless, personal managers have enjoyed a regulation-free
existence for all too long. When manager's roles were limited to the
primary function of providing career advice and personal attention, they
had an appropriate amount of flexibility to boost a client's career by
investing in the client's future. As managers have begun to produce on a
large scale, however, they have wandered into the dangerously conflicted
territory that worried the guilds fifty years ago.
Agents are pushing for the opposite outcome, to level the playing
field by eliminating the restrictions upon their ability to produce and to
partner with new media entities. Their motivations are obvious but their
arguments are misplaced. If the playing field is not level, it is because
managers enjoy the free reign that lead specifically to the breakup of MCA
many decades ago. The agents are, in effect, arguing for a return to the
days before the TAA, when fee-splitting and rampant conflicts drew the ire
of the Department of Justice's Antitrust Division. The solution is not
anarchy, but order.
384. Cf James Bates, Directors Guild Backs Current Agent System, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 9,
1999, at C9.
385. See Telephone Interview with Catherine York, Director of Government Relations,
Screen Actors Guild (Feb. 3, 1999).
MANAGERS ACTING AS PRODUCERS
Again, waiting for the Assembly to act could result in guild members
suffering if their representatives are regulated to a great degree. The unions
need to act affirmatively. Protections are needed to ensure members can
operate in a free market to their own advantage. Artists still need to avoid
the risk of being taken advantage of by their managers. Guilds enjoy a
particularly strategic vantage point in this skirmish and need to capitalize
upon it to protect their members.
V. CONCLUSION
Our government could spend its time better than trying to determine
whether to protect millionaire clients from their millionaire managers and
agents.
386
A good personal manager is often an artist's most trusted advisor. A
great personal manager and has no interests apart from those of the client.
When managers become producers, however, they acquire their own
interests, such as producer's fees and credits. These interests can conflict
dramatically with their clients' interests. No representative can serve the
dual role of employer and manager without suffering some degree of a
conflict of interest. Garry Shandling claimed that these conflicts could
expand to the realm of $100 million and filed suit against his long-time
friend to prove it.
3 87
While the rules governing the representation of artists have not
changed in many years, the personal management industry has mutated
radically within the past year. Managers have recently begun to leverage
their freedom from state and guild regulations to produce a growing
number of their clients' television shows and films. The enormous
profitability of this addition to the usual repertoire of manager services has
sparked a gold rush into the industry, led by none other than Hollywood
legend Michael Ovitz. With the coming of Ovitz and his disciples, the
entertainment industry can expect a commensurate rise in the instances of
managers advancing their own interests at the expense of their clients.
If litigation like the Shandling affair ever proceeds to trial, and the
manager is punished for his alleged wrongdoings, the industry may
certainly take note and amend its behavior accordingly. Artists cannot,
however, afford to rely upon one lawsuit and the message it may or may
not send if they wish to protect themselves. The legislative machine has
already begun to sputter to life in Sacramento. If the machine proceeds
386. Bates & Eller, supra note 358 (quoting a "top Hollywood manager").
387. See Lowry, supra note 22.
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unchecked, it may produce a result that no one in the entertainment
business will celebrate.
Artists and their guilds must act soon to help create a regulatory
scheme that best addresses their concerns before the job is done for them
by the blunt instrument of state regulation. In many ways, these conflicts
may constitute only a spat among millionaires, but it is a spat that threatens
to overhaul the entire paradigm of artist representation in Hollywood.
While millionaires can almost always wrestle with one another fairly
without the state refereeing, the entertainment guilds should play a unique
role in this particular drama.
Guilds are experienced in dealing with quarrels amongst millionaires.
They have been doing this since their inception. Now they need to awake
from their hibernation and acknowledge that managers have become very
much like the agents of the past, wielding too much power over artists by
representing them and simultaneously owning their productions. Guilds
should leave their members free to negotiate for what they want without the
risk of blindly using their collective bargaining power to regulate the
degree to which managers can produce. When even the artists' closest
lines of defense become a hostile force, the unions must heed their duty to
their members and earn their dues.
